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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 15, 1992, the Japanese Diet' adopted the Law Concerning
Cooperation in U.N. Peacekeeping and Other Operations (Peacekeeping Law).
The law, which came into force on August 10 of that year,' amended the
Self-Defense Forces Law3 to allow the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to
participate in U.N. peacekeeping. 4 Thereafter, Japan took a significantly
more active role in U.N. activities. The Japanese government sent three
electoral monitors to Angola to participate in the U.N. Angola Verification
Mission (UNAVEM II),' more than 680 personnel including a 600-member
SDF ground unit to Cambodia to participate in the U.N. Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 6 and a 48-member SDF transport unit to
Mozambique to participate in the U.N. Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).7
1. The Diet, the legislative body of Japan, consists of an upper house, the House of Councilors, and
a lower house, the House of Representatives. A bill can be proposed by the Cabinet, individual members
of the Diet, or Diet committees. A government-proposed bill originates in the Cabinet and is usually
drafted by government bureaucrats. Bills can be introduced in either house, where a committee will discuss
the bill. If the committee votes for adoption, it passes the bill to the plenary house. The same process is
repeated in the other house of the Diet, and a bill becomes law on passage by both houses. The lower
house, the House of Representatives, takes precedence over the upper house in that it may override an
unfavorable vote by the House of Councilors with a two-thirds majority. See generally SAT6 Koji, KENP6
[THE CoNSTrrruTON] 140-41, 158-59 (1990).
2. Kokusaireng6 Heiwa Iji Katsud6-T6 ni Taisuru Kyoryoku ni Kansuru H6ritsu [Law Concerning
Cooperation in U.N. Peacekeeping and Other Operations], Law No. 79 (June 19, 1992), 1011 JURIsUTO
[JURIST] 33 (1992) [hereinafter Peacekeeping Law]. For an unofficial English translation, see 32 I.L.M.
215 (1993).
3. Jieitai H6 [Self-Defense Forces Law], Law No. 165 (June 9, 1954) [hereinafter SDF Law].
4. Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, supplementary provisions, art. 8 (adding Article 100(7) to SDF
Law and stipulating that Director-General of Defense Agency may order SDF units to carry out
International Peace Cooperation Assignments (IPCA) and other functions provided for in Peacekeeping
Law).
5. See Angola Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryoku Gyomu Jisshi Keikaku [Angola International Peace
Cooperation Assignments Implementation Plan], 1011 JURIsJTO [JURIST] 42 (1992). The U.N. Security
Council established UNAVEM II to monitor the cease-fire, troop demobilization, and September 1992
legislative and presidential elections in Angola. S.C. Res. 696, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2991st mtg.,
U.N. Doc. SIRES/696 (1991); see also Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola
Verification Mission, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/22627 (1991).
6. See Cambodia Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryoku Gyomu Jisshi Keikaku [Cambodia International Peace
Cooperation Assignments Implementation Plan], 1011 JURisuTo [JURIST] 43 (1992) (authorizing dispatch
of eight SDF personnel to participate in cease-fire monitoring, 75 police personnel to participate in police
assistance, and a 600-member SDF ground unit to participate in logistical support and road construction).
In addition, a 400-member SDF navy unit and a 120-member SDF air force unit transported personnel and
materials to Cambodia.
UNTAC had a comprehensive mandate to monitor human rights, elections, military activities, civil
administration, police enforcement, and rehabilitation and repatriation of refugees. S.C. Res. 745, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., 3057th mtg., U.N. Doc. S1RES745 (1992); see also Report of the Secretary-General
on Cambodia, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/23613 (1992).
7. LetterDated 23 April 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25655 (1993); Letter Dated 23 April 1993 from the
President of the Security CouncilAddressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S125656 (1993); David E. Sanger, Japan Grows Wary of Cambodia Role, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1993,
at A3. The Security Council established ONUMOZ to assist in political restructuring, to monitor the cease-
fire, troop demobilization, and elections, and to provide humanitarian assistance. S.C. Res. 797, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., 3149th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/797 (1992); see also Report of the Secretary-General
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The Peacekeeping Law was adopted through deliberate political
compromise.' Accordingly, an analysis of the law must take into account the
domestic political and legal environment of Japan, as well as the international
context in which Japan must operate. Japan faces formidable pressure to play
a more prominent role in international fora, especially the United Nations.
The degree of such pressure is evident from the argument that Japan should
only obtain a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council after it accepts
increased responsibility in U.N. military operations.9 Tugging in the opposite
direction are historical constraints on the expansion of Japan's international
role, particularly in military operations. Other Asian nations have vivid
memories of Japanese atrocities during the Second World War and generally
look upon proposals for a greater Japanese role in international affairs with
suspicion and apprehension. For example, the governments of South Korea
and China expressed discomfort when Japan introduced domestic legislation
that would expand its role in U.N. peacekeeping.'"
Domestically, the then-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) had long studied the possibility of
Japanese participation in U.N. operations" and had been waiting for the
right opportunity to initiate such participation.' 2 Opposition political parties,
led by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP),t3 and the Japanese public, however,
remained wary of government attempts to expand their nation's role. As a
rule, the people of Japan have opposed any buildup of the SDF, and have
watched closely over government policies concerning international security in
general and the role of the SDF in particular. After the Gulf War, however,
on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/24892 (1992).
8. See generally Aurelia George, Japan's Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: Radical
Departure or Predictable Response?, 33 ASIAN SuRv. 560 (1993) (describing domestic and international
political environment affecting Japan at time Peacekeeping Law was adopted). In the summer of 1993, the
Liberal Democratic Party's thirty-eight years of rule came to an end, drastically changing the political
environment in Japan. Even so, the basic government policies concerning Japanese participation in U.N.
peacekeeping operations have not changed. The Hosokawa government and the newly installed Hata
government have yet to announce an official view of Japan's role in U.N. peacekeeping.
9. See, e.g., Chew Tai Soo, The Keys to Membership of the U.N. Security Council, Bus. TIMES,
Jan. 30-31, 1993, at 4 (statement of Permanent Representative of Singapore to the United Nations).
10. YAMAUCHi TosHI-IRO, HEIWA KENP6 NO RIRON [THE THEORY OF THE PEACE CONSTITUTION]
386 (1992).
11. The MFA began studying the possibility of Japanese participation in U.N. military operations
as early as 1966. See generally KozAi SHIGERU, KOKUREN NO HEIWA III KATSUD [U.N. PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS] 494-95 (1991). In 1966, the Tokyo Daily reported that the government had completed the
outline of a draft U.N. cooperation law. Even though the government denied the existence of such a draft,
it acknowledged that it had been studying the issue. In 1982, the MFA asked a private group of seven
experts, among them Saito Shizuo, a former U.N. Ambassador, and Professor Kozai Shigeru of Kyoto
University, to examine U.N. peacekeeping functions. The group's final report proposed active participation
of Japanese personnel in U.N. peacekeeping operations, although it did not specifically mention SDF
participation. Id. at 502.
12. With strong MFA support, LDP leaders made Japanese participation in U.N. peacekeeping
operations a diplomatic goal in the late 1980s. Japan began sending civil personnel to U.N. peacekeeping
operations in 1988. See infra note 34.
13. See KOZAI, supra note 11, at496-98.
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Japan's domestic political environment changed dramatically. Although the
government of Japan paid $13 billion to support coalition forces, it
encountered harsh criticisms from the international community for failing to
send military personnel to the Gulf. The Japanese people thus began to realize
that their nation could not fulfill its expected international role through
financial contributions alone.' 4
Japan's laws have constituted the most significant restraints on expanding
its international, and especially its military, role. The Japanese government
sought to circumvent these restraints in drafting the Peacekeeping Law. Its
unusually complex and detailed text is carefully worded to minimize questions
of constitutionality. Accordingly, to fully appreciate the significance of the
Peacekeeping Law, one must first understand the legal framework,
particularly the constitutional framework, within which it was promulgated.
The Japanese government is facing new challenges. During and since the
adoption of the Peacekeeping Law, U.N. operations have changed
profoundly. 5 Not only has the number of operations and personnel involved
in each operation increased dramatically in recent years, but the nature of
operations has also changed significantly. For example, there seems to be a
trend toward the combining of peacemaking and peacekeeping functions on the
one hand, and, more controversially, of peace-enforcing and peacekeeping
functions on the other.'6 Moreover, almost all recent U.N. operations have
dealt with civil conflict, an especially troublesome area.' 7 To make matters
worse, parties to civil conflicts have increasingly become hostile to the United
Nations and defied its authority and legitimacy. General Aidid in Somalia, the
Serbian forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and
UNITA in Angola are but a few examples of those who have challenged the
United Nations' authority. In the future, Japan may be asked to participate in
these new and more dangerous peacekeeping operations. But can Japan
participate? This Article attempts to answer this question through an objective
legal evaluation of the scope and limits of the Peacekeeping Law.
In Part II of this Article, I set forth the constitutional and legal framework
within which the Peacekeeping Law was drafted. I then discuss the impetus
for the law - how the government came to realize the inadequacy of existing
laws and the need for new legislation to respond effectively to international
14. Courtney Purrington, Tokyo's PolicyResponses During the Gulf War and the Impact of the "Iraqi
Shock" on Japan, 65 PAC. AFF. 161, 168-69, 171-72 (1992).
15. See H.E. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Beyond Peacekeeping, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 113
(1992) (discussing new trend in U.N. peacekeeping operations).
16. Kozai Shigeru, Kokusairengo no Funso Shori Kino no Do0 [The Trend in U.N. Conflict
Management Functions], 390 KOKUSAI MONDAI [INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS] 2, 7-10 (1992) [hereinafter
Kozai, Conflict Management].
17. U.N. operations to restore law and order between factions within a state are more difficult than
operations to create a buffer zone between conflicting states. JAMES A. STEGENGA, THE UNITED NATIONS
FORCE IN CYPRUS 94 (1968); Brian E. Urquhart, Peacekeeping: A Vielvfrom the Operational Center, in




expectations and domestic criticism. In Part I, I examine the substantive
provisions of the Peacekeeping Law against the backdrop of the practice of
U.N. peacekeeping operations. This analysis reveals significant inconsis-
tencies, actual and potential, between the Peacekeeping Law and U.N.
practice. In Part IV, I consider whether Japan, under the Peacekeeping Law,
would be able to participate in modern U.N. operations. This examination
suggests several issues that the Peacekeeping Law does not adequately
address. In Part V, I recommend ways in which the Japanese government,
when it reviews the law in 1995, should improve the Peacekeeping Law so as
to make it more effective.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING JAPANESE PARTICIPATION IN
U.N. FORCES
A. The Japanese Constitution, Related Laws, and Practice
The Japanese constitution is the supreme law of the nation. " Thus,
Japanese participation in U.N. operations must always accord with the
constitution's provisions. The key provision of the Japanese constitution
related to peacekeeping is Article 9, which states:
1. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force
as means of settling international disputes.
2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces,
as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the
state will not be recognized. 9
Article 9's prohibition on military forces calls into question the
constitutionality of the SDF's very existence. Many Japanese academics
contend that maintaining the SDF is unconstitutional.20 The government,
however, interprets Article 9 as not denying Japan the right to defend itself
or the right to maintain a minimum force necessary to exercise that right. It
argues that the SDF constitutes a minimum force and its existence therefore
does not violate Article 9. The government has consistently maintained,
however, that the SDF cannot constitutionally join the armed forces of other
nations in collective self-defense, as Article 9 permits the exercise of self-
18. KENP6 [CONSTITUTION] art. 98(1) ("This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and
no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions
hereof, shall have legal force or validity.").
19. KENP6 [CONSTITUTION] art. 9.
20. See, e.g., SAT6 ISAO, NIPPONKOKU KENP6 GAIsETSU [AN OUTLINE OF THE JAPANESE
CONSTITUTION] 87 (4th ed. 1991); YAMAUCHI, supra note 10, at 59-74; Sugihara Yasuo, Kenpo Dai Kya
Jo no Jidai [The Era ofArticle Nine of the Constitution], in HEIWA TO KOKUSAi KY6CH6 NO KENP6-GAKu
[CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES FOR PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION] 103, 106 (Sugihara Yasuo
et al. eds., 1990).
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defense only to the extent necessary to defend the nation of Japan.2"
Even assuming the constitutionality of the SDF's existence, the legality
of dispatching the SDF to a foreign country remains controversial. In 1954,
when the SDF was established, the House of Councilors passed a resolution
prohibiting foreign dispatch of the SDF.2 This resolution did not, however,
necessarily bar Japan from all U.N. operations. At the time the House of
Councilors passed the resolution, the Japanese government interpreted the
phrase "dispatch abroad" narrowly, to mean the dispatch of troops with the
intent to exercise fully the right of belligerency.' The 1954 resolution,
therefore, does not speak to SDF participation in U.N. operations that do not
presuppose belligerent activities.
The government first confronted the issue of Japanese participation in
1958, when U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold asked Japan to send
ten SDF officers to the U.N. Observation Group in Lebanon. Although the
Japanese government denied the request,24 citing incompatibility with
domestic law, the incident spawned active discussion about the
constitutionality of the SDF's participation in U.N. forces.' During this
debate, the government distinguished between different types of U.N.
operations. While leaving open the possibility of Japanese participation in
U.N. peacekeeping activities, the government opposed involvement in
enforcement activities like those undertaken during the Korean War.26 Prime
Minister Ikeda, for example, stated that the constitution may permit SDF
participation in U.N. military activities when those activities do not involve
21. For an analysis of the government's interpretation of Article 9, see Sat6 Isao, Dal Kya J6 no
Seifu Kaishaku no Kiseki to Ronten, [The Locus and Issues of the Government's Interpretation of Article
Nine] (pts. I & 2), 1001 JuRIsuTo [JURIsT] 72 (1992), 1003 JURIsUTo [JuRIsT] 38 (1992). According to
Sata, the Japanese government interprets Article 9 to allow self-defense, although only with the minimum
of necessary force. Maintenance of offensive war potential is prohibited, however. The dispatch abroad
of the SDF with the purpose of using force is outside the scope of self-defense and is therefore prohibited.
The constitution also prohibits collective self-defense.
Participation in U.N. forces is not per se unconstitutional, but if their purpose and duties involve
the use of force, participation is not permitted. Participation in a force formed under Article 43 of the
U.N. Charter would also raise constitutional questions.
22. KOZAI, supra note 11, at 477-78.
23. Id. at 478-80. Since Article 9 already prohibited such activity, the resolution had little real
significance. Id.
24. Id. at 485.
25. In 1961, U.N. Ambassador Matsudaira said to the press:
I was deeply troubled when the Government turned down the U.N. request to send troops to
the conflict in Lebanon in 1958. Japan's pledge of cooperation with the United Nations and
its attitude of rejecting any participation in U.N. forces are inconsistent. In the future, at least
observers should be deployed.
Id. at 486. In the ensuing political furor, opposition parties demanded Matsudaira's resignation until the
Diet and the government formally recognized that his statement was inappropriate and reaffirmed its
intention not to dispatch the SDF abroad. Id.
26. Id. at 486-87. Professor Kozai, writing in 1965, concluded that while participation in the
collective enforcement units envisaged in Article 42 of the U.N. Charter may be unconstitutional,
participation in peacekeeping operations - because of their non-belligerent and international character -
is allowed under the constitution. Shigeru Kozai, Japanese Participation in United Nations Forces:
Possibilities and Limitations, 9 JAPANESE ANN. OF INT'L L. 10, 17 (1965) [hereinafter Kozai, Japanese
Participation].
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the use of force and are conducted under U.N. command.27 The JSP, the
newly formed Democratic Socialist Party, and the Komei (Clean Government)
Party all opposed this interpretation, arguing that it opened the way for SDF
dispatch in less limited circumstances.28 The debate continued throughout the
1960s and 1970s as U.N. peacekeeping activities expanded.29
In 1980, the government presented to the Diet its official position paper
on the issue of Japanese participation in U.N. operations." The government
distinguished between peacekeeping operations and the kind of forces formed
under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter for the purpose of carrying out military
objectives during the Korean War. It then stbdivided U.N. peacekeeping
operations into two types: (1) cease-fire observation groups, which are
charged with observing cease-fires and reporting any breach to the Security
Council; and (2) peacekeeping forces, which are charged with preventing
conflict, disengaging troops, and restoring and maintaining internal security.
By making this distinction, the government implicitly took the position that
since the activities of U.N. observation groups do not involve the use of
force, participation in them is constitutionally possible.3
The government, refraining from making any generalized statements
regarding participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations, contended that they
vary with respect to their purposes and duties. Instead, it specified the
conditions under which participation could be deemed constitutional: If the
purpose and duties of a particular U.N. operation involved the use of force,
the SDF could not participate under the constitution. If a U.N. operation did
not involve the use of force, however, the SDF could participate, but only if
explicit legislation entrusted such a duty to the SDF. Since the SDF Law did
not provide such a mandate,32 the SDF could not participate in these
operations either, at least not without further action in the Diet.
At present, Japan adheres to the interpretation set forth in its 1980
position paper.33 This view, along with its narrow interpretation of the
phrase "dispatch abroad," forms the foundation of and the justification for the
27. KOZI, supra note 11, at 488-89.
28. Id. at 489-99.
29. See id. at 490-500.
30. Id. at 500-01. Usually, the government presents unified official views after it is requested to do
so by the Diet or an individual Diet member.
31. Id. at 501.
32. The SDF is charged with defending Japan's peace and independence against direct and indirect
aggression, and, when necessary, maintaining public order. SDF Law, supra note 3, art. 3. Supplementary
tasks that allow the SDF to work beyond the territory of Japan include scientific research in Antarctica,
id. art. 100(4), transportation of the Prime Minister or other national dignitaries, id. art. 100(5), and
international emergency rescue operations, id. art. 100(6).
33. The legal force of the government's position on Article 9 has been disputed. Compare Robert
B. Funk, Japan's Constitution and U.N. Obligations in the Persian Gulf War: A Case for Non-Military
Participation in U.N. Enforcement Actions, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 363, 379 (1992) (arguing that
government's official interpretations acquire force of law under certain circumstances, even without formal
constitutional amendment) with SAT6, supra note 1, at 566 (criticizing such view). The government's
interpretation of Article 9, especially with respect to the participation of the SDF in U.N. forces, is but
one among many; it is neither ipsofacto unconstitutional nor ipsofacto legally binding.
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1992 Peacekeeping Law. It also explains why the Diet had to amend the SDF
Law at the time it adopted the Peacekeeping Law - only a legislatively
imposed duty would permit Japan to send the SDF to a foreign territory. 4
But the Peacekeeping Law did not follow directly from the position paper.
Rather, it was a reaction to growing international challenges and the several
unsuccessful attempts to alter domestic law to meet those challenges.
B. The Gulf War and the Japanese Response
The Japanese government has proclaimed its desire to follow a United
Nations-centered diplomacy. The Gulf War and the quick response of the
United Nations to the crisis tested Japan's commitment and ability to follow
through on this diplomatic goal. Pressure to participate in U.N. efforts
mounted from Japan's most important ally, the United States. During a
meeting with Prime Minister Kaifu on September 29, 1990, President Bush
reportedly requested that the SDF provide background support, transportation,
and medical assistance. 5 The government's various measures in response
demonstrated that legislative constraints were preventing Japan from dealing
effectively with the situation. Failed efforts at legislative change and the
debates accompanying them eventually helped establish the political consensus
and legal foundation necessary to pass the Peacekeeping Law.36
1. The 1990 Draft Law Concerning Peace Cooperation with the United
Nations
Faced with increasing pressure from the international community, the
34. Non-military personnel could be and already had been sent to participate in U.N. operations
before the Peacekeeping Law came into effect. Existing laws concerning the treatment of national and local
public servants participating in international organizations specified that such personnel became temporary
staff of the MFA while working for international organizations. See Sangi-in [House of Councilors],
Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryoku-T ni Kansuru Tokubetsu linkai Kaigiroku [Minutes of the Proceedings of the
Special Committee on International Peace Cooperation], 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 4, at 15 (May
7, 1991) (statement of Tanba Minoru, Director of U.N. Bureau of MFA). Minutes of the House of
Councilors will hereinafter be cited as HC.
As of August 1992, Japan had sent 38 personnel to 7 U.N. operations: 1 official each to the U.N.
Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), U.N. Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
(UNIIMOG), U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), U.N. Advance Mission in Cambodia
(UNAMIC) and UNTAC; 27 electoral monitors to the U.N. Transition Assistance Group in Namibia
(UNTAG); and 6 electoral monitors to the U.N. Observer Group in Central America (ONUVEN). Uehara
Takanori, Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryoku Ho (PKO HO) no Seiritsu [Adoption of United Nations Peacekeeping
Cooperation Law], 1433 TOKI NO H6REI [LEGISLATION OF THE TIMES] 6, 11 (1992). Since August 1992,
Japan has participated in UNAVEM II, UNTAC, and UNOMOZ. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying
text.
35. YAMAUCHI, supra note 10, at 313. Vice President Quayle also stated during his meeting with
Prime Minister Kaifu six weeks later that the United States would welcome the visible presence of Japan
in the Gulf region. Id. at 313-14.
36. George, supra note 8, at 563; Purrington, supra note 14, at 171-76. GAIMUSH6 [MINISTRY OF




Japanese government introduced a bill on October 16, 1990 to enable the SDF
to cooperate not only with the United Nations, but also with United States-led
coalition forces in the Gulf." The bill, the Draft Law Concerning Peace
Cooperation with the United Nations (Draft Law), sought to circumvent
constitutional constraints on the use of the SDF, and therefore met with strong
criticism from opposition parties and the public. It was dropped without a vote
for several reasons.38 First, permissible activities for the SDF were defined
as those based on or those ensuring the effectiveness of U.N. resolutions for
the maintenance of international peace and security. 9 Permissible activities
under the Draft Law included not only those carried out by the United Nations
and other international organizations, but also those carried out by other
states. This provision was intended to allow Japan to cooperate with coalition
forces engaged in activities beyond those specifically based on U.N.
resolutions or carried out by the United Nations, and clearly conflicted with
the government's 1980 position paper.'
Second, although the Draft Law stated that activities carried out under it
would not constitute threats of or the use of force,41 the government could
not guarantee that the SDF would not use force while participating in the
United States-led coalition.42 Attempting to assuage these concerns, the
Director of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, Kud5 Atsuo, rationalized that to
participate in coalition forces that are intended for the use of force is
unconstitutional, but to cooperate while remaining outside the command of
such forces is permissible under Article 9 of the constitution.' 3 Not
surprisingly, this acrobatic interpretation failed to convince the opposition
parties or the public of the Draft Law's constitutionality.
Third, the text of the Draft Law did not clearly distinguish the activities
of the coalition forces' from traditional peacekeeping activities such as
cease-fire monitoring, electoral monitoring, and logistical support.45 The
Peacekeeping Law introduced in 1991, in some respects, was a carefully
crafted rejoinder to these criticisms.
37. Kokusaireng5 Heiwa Kybryoku Han [Draft Law Concerning Peace Cooperation with the United
Nations], in 970 JuliSuTo [JuRisT] 82 (1990) [hereinafter Draft Law].
38. Funk, supra note 33, at 387-88.
39. Draft Law, supra note 37, art. 3(1). The government acknowledged that the coalition forces had
the function of ensuring the effectiveness of U.N. Security Council Resolution 660. See Kenkyakai:
Kokuren Heiwa Kyoryoku Hoan no HO-Teki Imi [Symposium: The Legal Significance of the Draft Law
Concerning Peace Cooperation with the United Nations], 970 JURisuTo [JuRIST] 59, 67 (1990).
40. See Draft Law, supra note 37, art. 22 (providing for participation of SDF units and SDF
personnel in International Peace Cooperation Assignments), supplementary provisions, art. 4. (amending
SDF Law).
41. Id. art. 2(2).
42. WANGAN SENS6 TO KAIGAi HAHEI [THE GULF WAR AND FOREIGN TROOP DISPATCH] 232-34
(Kenmochi Kazumi et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter KENMOCI]. To downplay this concern during the Diet
debate on the new Peacekeeping Law, the government emphasized the peaceful nature of U.N.
peacekeeping operations and the existence of cease-fires.
43. Id. at 205.
44. Draft Law, supra note 37, art. 3(1).
45. Id. art. 3(2); see also KozAI, supra note 11, at 503.
1994]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2. The Attempted Dispatch of SDF Aircraft to the Gulf Area
After the Draft Law failed, the Japanese government adopted a special
Cabinet ordinance enabling it to dispatch SDF aircraft to transport refugees
in the Gulf area if a competent international organization requested such aid
from Japan.' The ordinance was based on Article 100(5) of the SDF Law,
which permits the use of SDF aircraft to transport the Prime Minister and
other national dignitaries.47 The government explained that sending SDF
aircraft in accordance with this ordinance would be purely humanitarian and
non-military in nature and therefore would not violate the constitution. 48
Apart from the question of constitutionality, the application of Article
100(5) to the transportation of refugees in foreign countries was clearly a
distortion, if not a direct violation, of the article. 49 Recognizing this, the
public criticized the measure. 0 In the end, no actual dispatch resulted
because no competent international organization requested the assistance of
SDF aircraft."1 This Cabinet ordinance is nevertheless noteworthy insofar as
it evidences the desperation of the Japanese government and reveals the
inadequacy of contemporary laws to deal effectively with contingencies like
the Gulf War. Not coincidentally, the 1992 Peacekeeping Law explicitly
provides for the SDF to use its aircraft to transport refugees affected by
conflicts.52
3. The Dispatch of SDF Minesweepers to the Persian Gulf
On April 24, 1991, after the Gulf War, the Japanese government decided
to send SDF marine minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in response to a request
from the United States. 3 It found authority for this in Article 99 of the SDF
Law, which permits the removal and disposal of explosive and dangerous
materials from the sea.54 This time the Japanese government actually sent a
minesweeping squadron, which disposed of thirty-four mines in the Persian
Gulf between late April and October of 1991.' The government defended
the constitutionality of the mission on the grounds that a formal cease-fire had
been in effect, and that the purpose of the mission - to dispose of abandoned
46. KENMoCHI, supra note 42, at 281-82.
47. See supra note 32.
48. YAMAUCHI, supra note 10, at 327 (quoting statement of Prime Minister Kaifu to Diet on January
25, 1991).
49. Id. at 330-32.
50. Id. at 328; Purrington, supra note 14, at 165-66.
51. YAMAUCHI, supra note 10, at 328.
52. Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, art. 3(3)(k).
53. YAMAUCHI, supra note 10, at 341.
54. SDF Law, supra note 3, art. 99.
55. YAMAuCHI, supra note 10, at 341-42.
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mines - did not require any use of force. 6
Even if the constitution permitted the government to send SDF
minesweepers to the Persian Gulf, the measure nevertheless was an
unacceptably expansive interpretation of Article 99 of the SDF Law. Although
Article 99 allows mine removal activities "in the sea" without expressly
defining a geographical region, the legislative intent behind the provision was
clearly to limit minesweeping to the seas surrounding Japan.57 This narrower
interpretation is consistent with the SDF's basic duty to defend the territory
of Japan and with the limited activities that the SDF may carry out beyond
Japan's territory."8 The opposition parties, except for the Democratic
Socialist Party, and a plurality of public opinion opposed the government's
broader interpretation of the SDF Law."9 Again, this measure shows that the
Japanese government had to engage in strained interpretations of statutes in
order to meet international expectations.
The debates over the measures taken by the government during the Gulf
War had a significant impact on the domestic political environment. They
helped the Japanese people understand U.N. peacekeeping operations and
generated popular support for U.N. efforts.6" On November 8, 1990, two
opposition parties agreed with the LDP that Japan needed to provide human,
as well as material and financial, assistance to U.N. operations.6' Prompted
by its recent experience in the Gulf War and favorable domestic
developments, but still constrained by the constitutional and statutory
framework described above, the Kaifu Cabinet submitted the Peacekeeping
Law to the Diet in September 1991.62 The main objective of the law was to
56. Id. at 341. In 1987, the Japanese government considered the dispatch of SDF minesweepers to
the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, but decided against it for a number of reasons. First, the Gulf
was still a belligerent area. Second, opposition from Asian countries was strong, and finally, other non-
military cooperation was possible. At the time, Prime Minister Nakasone stated that minesweeping on the
high seas around Japan was clearly permitted under the constitution, and therefore minesweeping on the
high seas in the Persian Gulf would also be constitutional. Hamaya Hidehiro, Kokuren no Heiwa Iji
Katsudo to Jieitai no Sanka [U.N. Peacekeeping Operations and the Participation of the Self-Defense
Forces], 18 SHIN B6EI RONSHU [JOURNAL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE] 52, 59-60 (1990).
57. YAMAUCHI, supra note 10, at 344.
58. See supra note 32.
59. Purrington, supra note 14, at 173.
60. KOZAI, supra note 11, at 503. One poll indicates that the end of the Gulf War was a turning
point in Japanese attitudes toward foreign dispatch of the SDF. While 58% of those polled opposed the
SDF's foreign dispatch in November 1990, by April 1991, 56% supported it. At that time, only 24% of
citizens polled opposed the SDF's foreign dispatch, 47% supported SDF participation in non-military
activities abroad, and 20% supported SDF participation in military aspects of U.N. peacekeeping
operations. PKO Hoan: Nihon no Tenkanten: Kenpo Keishi no Kangae Sodatsu [Draft Peacekeeping Law:
A Turning Point for Japan: The Growing Trend to Neglect the Constitution], ASAHI SHINBUN, May 31,
1992, at 1.
61. For the text of the agreed-upon memorandum among the LDP, Komei Party, and the Democratic
Socialist Party, see KENMOCHI, supra note 42, at 290.
62. For a concise summary of the legislative history of the Peacekeeping Law, see Yajima Sadanori,
PKO Kyoryoku Hoan o Meguru Kokkai Rongi [The Diet Discussion Concerning the Peacekeeping Law],
168 RIPP6 TO CHOSA [LEGISLATION AND RESEARCH] 47 (1992) [hereinafter Yajima, Diet Discussion];
Yajima Sadanori, PKO Kyoryoku Hdan no Seiritsu [The Adoption of the Peacekeeping Law], 172 RIPP6
TO CH6SA [LEGISLATION AND RESEARCH] 43 (1992) [hereinafter Yajima, Adoption].
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enable the SDF, for the first time in Japan's history, to participate in military
operations abroad. Part III of this Article examines the scope and limits of the
Peacekeeping Law to determine whether the government has succeeded in
achieving this objective.
III. THE 1992 PEACEKEEPING LAW: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. Principles and Organization
The stated purpose of the Peacekeeping Law is to "enable Japan to
contribute actively to United Nations-centered efforts for international peace"
through cooperation in U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian relief
operations." Contributing activities are called International Peace
Cooperation Assignments (IPCA). Article 3(3) of the Peacekeeping Law
enumerates specific tasks that qualify as IPCA.64 The fundamental principle
of the Peacekeeping Law is that IPCA "shall not be tantamount to the threat
or use of force."65
The Peacekeeping Law creates an International Peace Cooperation
Headquarters (Headquarters), headed by Japan's Prime Minister." For each
U.N. operation, Headquarters is to draft and revise an implementation plan
(Implementation Plan) that enunciates the basic policy behind Japanese
participation and specifies the content, scope, and duration of IPCA, as well
as the equipment to be used.67 The Cabinet must approve the Implementation
Plan,6" and report its approval to the Diet.69 In addition, Headquarters is to
draft operating procedures (Operating Procedures) that contain more detailed
and confidential directions to Japanese personnel in the field.7" The
Operating Procedures must be prepared and revised to conform with the
commands of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.7
63. Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, art. 1.
64. The following qualify as IPCA: (a) monitoring of cease-fires and of withdrawal and
demobilization of armed forces; (b) stationing in and patrolling of buffer zones; (c) inspection of weapons;
(d) collection, storage, and disposal of abandoned weapons; (e) assisting in designation of cease-fire lines;
(f) assisting in exchanges of prisoners of war; (g) supervision and management of elections; (h) advising
in police administration; (i) advising in other administrative matters; (j) provision of medical services; (k)
rescue of people affected by conflicts and assisting in their repatriation; (1) distribution of food and other
materials to affected people; (m) installation of facilities in areas damaged by conflicts; (n) repair or
maintenance of facilities or equipment damaged by conflicts; (o) restoration of natural environment; (p)
transportation, communication, and construction assignments not already specified; and (q) performance
of other tasks, as prescribed by Cabinet ordinance. Id. art. 3(3). The government was careful to exclude
disarmament from the list.
65. Id. art. 2(2).
66. Id. arts. 4(l), 5(1).
67. Id. arts. 4(2), 6.
68. Id. art. 6(l)-(2).
69. Id. art. 7.
70. Id. art. 8(1); HC, 123d Sess., Special Comm. No. 6, at25 (May 11, 1992) (statement of Cabinet
Councilor Nomura Kazunari).
71. Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, art. 8(2).
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IPCA are to be carried out by an International Peace Cooperation Corps
(Corps) comprised of civil servants, individual SDF personnel,' and others
employed by Headquarters.' The Corps is under the direction and
supervision of the Prime Minister.74 SDF units, while institutionally separate
from the Corps, can also participate in carrying out IPCA. SDF units,
however, remain under the direction and supervision of the Director-General
of the Defense Agency.7' Six of the IPCA that require relatively high
military capacities must be discharged by SDF personnel, acting either as
individuals or in units.76
B. Command Structure
The Peacekeeping Law contains numerous and potentially contradictory
provisions concerning the command of Japanese participants in U.N.
operations. For example, it states that peacekeeping operations are conducted
"under control of the United Nations,"' and Operating Procedures are to
"conform with commands of the Secretary-General."" The Prime Minister
of Japan, however, has power to "direct and supervise" Headquarters and
administrative divisions in the implementation of IPCA.79
In the initial stages of the debate, the government persistently denied that
the United Nations would have command and control over Japanese Corps
personnel and SDF members. It argued that the United Nations would have
authority to adjust the deployment and movement of units, but that actual
command and control over the operations of troops would rest with Japan."0
72. SDF participants in IPCA are referred to as "SDF Corps personnel." See id. art. 12(6). In
contrast, SDF members attached to SDF units are called "SDF personnel." See id. art. 9(5).
73. Id. arts. 11(1), 12. The Chief of Headquarters (i.e., the Prime Minister) may choose Corps
personnel from those volunteering to undertake IPCA or request relevant agencies, including the Defense
Agency, to assign qualified personnel to the Corps.
74. Id. art. 12(5).
75. Id. arts. 9(4) (providing that Director-General of Defense Agency may direct SDF units to
undertake IPCA), 13(2); see also Shagi-in [House of Representatives], Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryoku-T ni
Kansuru Tokubetsu linkai Kaigiroku [Minutes of the Proceedings of the Special Convnittee on International
Peace Cooperation], 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 4, at 14 (Nov. 19, 1991) (statement of Nomura
Kazunari). Minutes of the House of Representatives will hereinafter be cited as HR. Thus, the government,
notwithstanding its agreement with the Komei Party and the Democratic Socialist Party that SDF personnel
would cooperate with U.N. operations under a separate organization (i.e., the Corps), decided to utilize
the established organization and command structure of the SDF in carrying out U.N. military activities.
KENMOCHI, supra note 42, at 290.
76. Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, art. 12(1) (specifying that tasks enumerated in Article 3(3)(a)-
(f) are to be performed by SDF).
77. Id. art. 3(1) ("kokusairengo no tokatsu no shita ni okonawareru katsudo de atte").
78. Id. art. 8(2) ("jisshi yOryO no sakusei oyobi henko wa . .. jimusocho . . . ga okonau sashizu ni
tekigo suru yo ni okonau mono to suru").
79. Id. arts. 2(3), 5(2), 12(5) ("naikaku sori daiin wa . .. shiki-kantoku suru").
80. HR, 121st Sess., Special Comm. No. 3, at 20 (Sept. 25, 1991) (statement of Nomura Kazunari);
see also HR, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 3, at 16 (Nov. 18, 1991) (statement of Nomura Kazunari)
(noting that U.N. command does not presuppose hierarchial relationship or obedience, but that states
customarily follow its directions). Other government explanations of the command structure differed
subtly. For example, Tanba Minoru, Director of MFA's U.N. Bureau stated that the United Nations has
command over deployment, organization, conduct, or direction of an operation, but not over disciplinary
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Prime Minister Miyazawa once stated that Japanese Corps personnel were not
international civil servants and could not possibly come under the command
of the U.N. Secretary-General. He even added that a sovereign state could
never be under the command of the Secretary-General. t This stance,
however, is completely at odds with the established practice of U.N.
peacekeeping operations. The United Nations has repeatedly insisted that
personnel made available by participating states are under the command of the
United Nations82 and makes every effort to maintain this position.83
On November 27, 1991, the government submitted to the Diet its official
position paper on the issue of U.N. command. It explained that personnel
contributed by states are under the "command" of the United Nations. This
command refers to authority over troop deployment and various other matters,
as stipulated in the model agreement between the United Nations and states
contributing personnel.8 5 The position paper stated, however, that Operating
Procedures governing Japanese personnel, while drafted to conform with the
Secretary-General's mandate, would not come from the Secretary-General
directly. 6  Thus, according to the government interpretation, the
"commands" of the Secretary-General must first be filtered through the
Japanese Headquarters. Headquarters then drafts Operating Procedures, taking
into account the commands of the Secretary-General. 7 Japan may, however,
disregard those commands that, if carried out, would result in violations of the
action. HR, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 4, at 12 (Nov. 19, 1991).
81. HR, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 3, at 17 (Nov. 18, 1991). Miyazawa also stated that Corps
personnel are bound by Operating Procedures rather than the instructions of the Secretary-General. HR,
122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 4, at 12 (Nov. 19, 1991).
82. Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-keeping Operations in All TheirAspects,
Model Agreement Between the United Nations and Member States Contributing Personnel and Equipment
to United Nations Peace-keeping Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess.,
7, U.N. Doc. A/461185 (1991) [hereinafter Model Agreement]; see also INT'L PEACE ACADEMY,
PEACEKEEPER'S HANDBOOK 46 (1984) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. On the enlarged leadership role of the
Secretary-General, see STEGENGA, supra note 17, at 108.
83. For example, under Security Council Resolution 776, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3114th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/776 (1992) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 776], part of the U.N. Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia was financed by the states contributing troops. See Further Report
of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 743 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess.,
50, U.N. Do. S/24848 (1992) [hereinafter Do. S/24848]. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali terminated
this self-financing scheme in February 1993 because he had difficulty maintaining exclusive command over
those contingents. See Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
743 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 31-32, U.N. Do. S/25264 (1993) [hereinafter Do. S/252641.
84. For the full text of this document, see HR, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 8, at 17 (Nov. 27,
1991).
85. See Model Agreement, supra note 82, 7. These other matters refer to the "organization,
conduct and direction of [the United Nations peacekeeping operation]." Id. The contributing states,
however, maintain the authority to take disciplinary actions. Under the Peacekeeping Law, the Prime
Minister has shiki-kantoku over Japanese participants, which encompasses the authority to discipline. See
supra note 80 and accompanying text.
86. In presenting another government position paper submitted in May 1992, Foreign Minister
Watanabe Michio stated that SDF units will implement U.N. commands in accordance with the five
principles specified in Operating Procedures. HC, 123d Sess., Special Comm. No. 9, at2 (May 18, 1992);
see infra part III.F.
87. This position is codified in Article 8(2) of the law. Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, art. 8(2).
Japanese Peacekeeping Legislation
constitution, such as those relating to suspension of Japanese participation in
U.N. operations and the use of arms."5 In accordance with Operating
Procedures, the Prime Minister directs the activities of Corps members in the
field, and the Director-General of the Defense Agency directs the SDF units.













88. HC, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 3, at 21 (Dec. 5, 1991) (statement of Prime Minister
Miyazawa Kiichi) (stating Japan, because of constitutional limitations, reserves right to decide on
suspension of participation in operations and on use of arms); see infra note 165 and accompanying text.
The government relied heavily on the assumption that the United Nations does not order personnel or units
to use arms and only allows use of arms in certain situations. It argued that Japanese troops could therefore
comply with the strict limits on the use of arms imposed by the Peacekeeping Law while participating in
U.N. operations. HC, 123d Sess., Special Comm. No. 14, at 20 (June 1, 1992) (statement of Tanba
Minoru).
89. This diagram corresponds to a description made by Diet member Tabuchi Tetsuya during the
discussion. Cabinet Councilor Nomura Kazunari approved of the description. HC, 123d Sess., Special
Comm. No. 13, at 29 (May 29, 1992). It should be noted, however, that this command structure is by no
means apparent from the text of the Peacekeeping Law. The text fails to state explicitly which
governmental actors are to perform the various functions. Only in the Diet debates does the government
clearly set forth the command structure that the Peacekeeping Law contemplates. This failing is not
unusual in the legislative scheme of Japan, where records of Diet debates are often consulted by scholars
and practitioners alike in their analysis of laws.
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Whether the command structure envisioned in the Peacekeeping Law has
actually been implemented in the field is not known. It would be extremely
cumbersome if all directions and orders from the local U.N. commander had
to go through Headquarters in Tokyo and be incorporated in Operating
Procedures. Acknowledging this, the government stated that Operating
Procedures should be flexible enough to adapt to U.N. commands,9" and that
the authority to prepare and revise Operating Procedures could be delegated
to the captain of the Japanese Corps in the field.9 1 The Director of the
MFA's U.N. Bureau, Tanba Minoru, gave what is probably the most
appropriate and practical description of the command structure when he
stated, "We drafted the law to create a structure that would implement, in
actual situations, all the directions of the Force Commander without
change. "92
C. U.N. Peacekeeping Operations
Article 3 of the Peacekeeping Law sets forth the conditions for Japanese
participation in U.N. operations. Japan may participate only in operations that
are based on a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly or the U.N. Security
Council and carried out under the command and control of the United
Nations. 93 Article 3 also requires that there be (1) a cease-fire agreement
among the parties to the conflict, 94 (2) consent of the host state and the
disputing parties to the U.N. operation95 and to the Japanese IPCA
specifically, 96 and (3) a showing that the U.N. operation is impartial. 97 By
strictly defining the U.N. peacekeeping operations in which Japan can
participate, the Japanese government in effect acknowledged that it would not
participate in the kind of multinational force established during the Gulf War.
Prime Minister Kaifu confirmed this by stating that, under the Peacekeeping
Law, Japan could not cooperate with coalition or other forces intending to use
force. 98 The government also stated that Japan may not participate in
operations like that undertaken by the U.N. Operation in Congo (ONUC),
which was authorized to use force9 9 by Security Council Resolution 161."0
90. HC, 123d Sess., Special Comm. No. 13, at 30 (May 29, 1992) (statement of Nomura Kazunari).
91. HC, 123d Sess., Special Comm. No. 6, at 25 (May 11, 1992) (statement of Nomura Kazunari).
92. HC, 123d Sess., Special Comm. No. 3, at 8 (Apr. 28, 1992).
93. Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, art. 3(1).
94. Id. art. 3(1).
95. Id.
96. Id. art. 6(1)(1).
97. Id. art. 3(l); see infra part III.F.3.
98. See HR, 121st Sess., Special Comm. No. 4, at 9 (Sept. 26, 1991) (statement of Prime Minister
Kaifu Toshiki).
99. HR, 121st Sess., Special Comm. No. 3, at 17 (Sept. 25, 1991) (statement of Prime Minister
Kaifu Toshiki).
100. S.C. Res. 161, U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., 942d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/4741 (1961); see also S.C.
Res. 169, U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., 982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/5002 (1961). There was debate over whether
these resolutions authorized the ONUC to use force beyond the recognized scope of self-defense. The
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D. Humanitarian International Relief Operations
Article 3 also defines the international humanitarian relief operations
(Relief Operations) in which Japan may participate.1"' The requirements for
participation in Relief Operations under Article 3 are less strict than those for
peacekeeping operations. For instance, while Japan may participate in only
those peacekeeping operations called for by the U.N. General Assembly or the
U.N. Security Council, it may participate in humanitarian efforts initiated by
the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social
Council, or any of the other U.N. organs or specialized agencies enumerated
in the Peacekeeping Law.0" Whereas peacekeeping operations must be
under the command and control of the United Nations, other international
organizations and even states individually or collectively can command
humanitarian missions." °3 Peacekeeping operations require consent, a cease-
fire, and impartiality, but relief operations require only consent and a cease-
fire.' Even a cease-fire is unnecessary if the country in which the
operation takes place is not itself a party to the conflict.0 5
Because the Diet has not extensively discussed the content of Article
3,06 the precise scope of Relief Operations envisaged in the Peacekeeping
Law is not at all clear. 07 This confusion is exacerbated by the fact that
"humanitarian relief" has been neither defined nor firmly established in
international practice.' The close integration of relief operations and
peacekeeping operations, as in the protection of relief convoys in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Somalia, has further complicated the situation."°9 In such
integrated operations, unlike more traditional U.N. operations, peacekeepers/
Secretary-General defended the ONUC measures as necessary to ensure freedom of movement and as
legitimate self-defense.
101. Article 3 enumerates seven specific tasks that can be considered Relief Operations.
Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, art. 3(3)(j)-(p). These tasks overlap with those of peacekeeping
operations.
102. Id. art. 3(2), app. (beppyo) (listing such organs and agencies).
103. Id. art. 3(2).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. A few Diet members criticized the lack of precise limits on Relief Operations. See, e.g., HC,
123d Sess., Special Comm. No. 3, at 9-10 (Apr. 28, 1992) (statement of Yatabe Osamu) (noting that
requirement of request from Secretary-General limits peacekeeping, but not humanitarian operations).
107. Cabinet Councilor Nomura stated that Japan could participate in the relief operations going on
at that time for the Kurdish people in Iraq if certain conditions were fulfilled. Nomura did not specify what
these conditions would be. HR, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 5, at 10 (Nov. 20, 1991). He was likely
referring to the existence of a cease-fire agreement, consent, and impartiality.
108. Ueki Naoya, PKO Hoan 10 no Mondai-ten: Jindo-Teki na Kokusai Kyaen Katsud6 o Meguru
Kokusal HO-Jo no Mondai-ten [10 Problems of the Peacekeeping Law. Humanitarian International Relief
Operations Under International Law], 445 H6OGAKU SEMINAR [LAW SEMINAR] 52, 52 (1992).
109. On U.N. forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, see Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3-11, U.N. Doc. S/24540 (1992) [hereinafter Doc.
S/24540]; S.C. Res. 776, supra note 83, 2. On UNOSOM I before U.S. troops were introduced, see
The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 28-29, U.N. Doc.
S/23829 (1992) [hereinafter Doc. S/23829]; S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg. 4,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (1992) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 751].
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relief-providers must move through areas of armed conflict, rather than
merely keep the conflicting parties apart.110
Some may argue that the Peacekeeping Law's codification of
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in one statute evidences a
government intent to participate in such an integrated operation. According to
the U.N. Secretary-General, however, this kind of operation is not bound by
the condition of impartiality that the Peacekeeping Law explicitly requires for
Japanese participation in traditional peacekeeping."' Moreover, the very
reason for the protection of relief convoys is that an effective cease-fire and
the parties' consent, two necessary conditions for Japanese participation in any
peacekeeping or humanitarian relief operation,"' are lacking. Finally,
Article 3(3) does not include protection of relief convoys in its list of activities
that qualify as IPCA. For all these reasons, it is clear that Japan may not
participate in the protection of relief convoys. The Japanese Corps may
distribute food and other supplies, but it cannot protect such supplies by
military means.
E. Diet Control over Japanese Participation
The Peacekeeping Law submitted by the government underwent some
important changes during the Diet debates. All of the changes increased the
Diet's role in decisions to participate in U.N. operations. First, before SDF
units carry out any of the six tasks requiring higher military capacities,"'
the Prime Minister must obtain the Diet's approval. The Diet will consider the
dispatch "in light of the fivefold basic principles governing Japan's
participation" in U.N. efforts." 4
Second, if the SDF units are to continue performing those high military
capacity tasks for more than two years from the date of the Diet's original
approval, the Prime Minister must obtain Diet approval a second time."'
Thereafter, the Diet may renew its approval every two years. 6 If the Diet
disapproves, the government must terminate the assignments immediately. 
1 7
Third, these high military capacity tasks may not be performed by SDF
110. The Secretary-General said this operation was "pioneering a new dimension." He added that,
in convoy protection duties, U.N. forces may have to depart from the usual peacekeeping principle of
impartiality towards the parties to a conflict; they may have to fight against whoever tries to block or
destroy the convoys they are protecting. Doc. S/24848, supra note 83, 49.
111. Id. 49.
112. Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, art. 3(1)-(2).
113. See text accompanying supra note 76.
114. Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, art. 6(7); see also Yajima, Adoption, supra note 62, at 48-49.
On the five principles, see infra part III.F.
115. Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, art. 6(10); see also Yajima, Diet Discussion, supra note 62,
at 51.
116. Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, art. 6(12).
117. Id. art. 6(11).
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units until a date to be set forth by a separate law."' Under this so-called
"freezing provision," the government cannot assign high military capacity
tasks to SDF units until the Diet adopts legislation to "un-freeze" the above
provision. The double safeguard of the freezing provision and the approval
provisions reflects concern over the delicate constitutional questions raised by
SDF participation in U.N. operations that involve military activities. Through
these safeguards, the government sought to deflect controversy and obtain
wider domestic and international support for the Peacekeeping Law." 19
These changes raised questions concerning which activities require Diet
approval and are frozen until separate legislation is passed. A coalition of the
LDP, Komei Party, and Democratic Socialist Party explained that, under
certain circumstances, even low military capacity activities would require
legislative approval. This would occur where any of the six frozen tasks are
integral to the performance of low military capacity activities. 2 ' This rule,
however, may be extremely difficult to apply in concrete cases, as its contours
were not clarified in either the text of the Peacekeeping Law or the Diet
debates.
F. The "Five Principles" of Japanese Participation
The Peacekeeping Law established five principles to govern Japan's role
in U.N. peacekeeping efforts. Three of the principles set preconditions for
Japanese participation and the rest apply during participation. These
preconditions and requirements ensure that Corps and SDF participation in
U.N. operations will not violate the constitution.' As noted above, before
the Corps or SDF can be dispatched, there must be a cease-fire agreement,
consent of the parties, and a showing of impartiality. 22 After dispatch of
personnel, the use of arms must be limited to legitimate self-defense, 13 and
IPCA must be suspended or terminated if one of the other conditions no
118. Id. supplementary provisions, art. 2.
119. Yajima, Adoption, supra note 62, at 48-49.
120. Ji-Ko-Min no Hosoku Kenkai [Supplementary Views of the LDP-Komei-DSP], 1011 JURstro
[JuRisT] 42 (1992). In an interesting dialogue, one member of the Diet asked whether SDF units may
dispose of a mine, a frozen task, if that mine were found in the course of carrying out road construction,
a non-frozen task. The three-party coalition stated that disposing of a mine in such a situation would not
be a frozen activity. HR, 123d Sess., Special Comm. No. 4, at 4 (June 10, 1992) (statement of Nomura
Kazunari).
121. HR, 121st Sess., Special Comm. No. 5, at 19 (Sept. 30, 1991) (statement of Kud5 Atsuo); HR,
122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 3, at 4 (Nov. 18, 1991) (statement of Nomura Kazunari). The Japanese
government modeled the Peacekeeping Law after Switzerland's domestic requirements for participating
in U.N. peacekeeping operations. The Swiss requirements for participation are formulated to conform with
its constitutionally mandated position as a neutral state. Swiss law requires (1) consent of the parties
directly involved in the conflict, (2) impartiality of the operation, (3) use of arms only in self-defense in
cases of necessity, and (4) withdrawal if one of the above conditions is no longer fulfilled. HR, 122d
Sess., Special Comm. No. 7(2), at 4-5 (Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Professor Kozai Shigeru).
122. See text accompanying notes 93-97.
123. Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, art. 24(3)-(4).
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longer exists. 124
Article 3's requirements of cease-fire, consent, impartiality, and the
limitation of use of force to self-defense generally mirror already-established
U.N. requirements for peacekeeping operations."2 A problem arises,
however, because under the Peacekeeping Law the Japanese government is to
make its own determinations on whether the conditions for Japanese
participation have been fulfilled. Japanese determinations may not accord with
those of the United Nations that govern the entire U.N. operation.
1. Cease-Fire
Article 3 of the Peacekeeping Law requires that the parties to a conflict
agree to and maintain a cease-fire. This requirement is intended to ensure that
Japanese forces do not participate in combat. The government initially
interpreted Article 3 strictly, as requiring a de facto as well as a de jure
cease-fire before Japan could participate.126 Faced with recent developments
in the former Yugoslavia, the government has retreated from this position and
now requires only an "overall cease-fire." 127
In order for the United Nations to formulate a workable mandate for a
peacekeeping operation, the parties in conflict must at least agree to a cease-
fire.'28 The United Nations, however, does not require, as a precondition
for the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers, a guarantee that the cease-fire will
be completely observed.'29 In fact, the mandate of many U.N. operations
presupposes violations of cease-fire agreements in that the operations are
entrusted with the task of restoring cease-fire conditions. For example, in
considering deployment of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in
Croatia, the Secretary-General declared that random and occasional violations
of the cease-fire would not rule out deployment. Rather, evidence that parties
124. Id. arts. 6(13)(1), 8(l)(6).
125. KozAI, supra note 11, at 386-89; UNITED NATIONS, THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF
UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING 5-7 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter BLUE HELMETS]; Indar Jit Rikhye,
Peacekeeping and Peacemaking, in WISEMAN, supra note 17, at 6-7. For broader discussion of the legal
issues with respect to U.N. peacekeeping, see E. Suy, Legal Aspects of U.N. Peace-Keeping Operations,
35 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 318 (1988).
126. HR, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 3, at 29 (Nov. 18, 1991) (statements of Miyashita S6hei,
Director-General of the Defense Agency, and Nomura Kazunari).
127. HC, 123d Sess., Special Comm. No. 5, at 27-28 (May 8, 1992) (statement of Tanba Minoru);
see also, HR, 121st Sess., Special Comm. No. 4, at 28 (Sept. 26, 1991) (statement of Tanba Minoru).
128. Recent U.N. operations in the former Yugoslavia and in Mozambique bring to light the
importance of the cease-fire requirement: continued fighting in those areas has prevented the United
Nations from fulfilling its peacekeeping and humanitarian mandates. See Further Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 749 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 25, U.N. Doc.
S/23900 (1992) [hereinafter Doc. S/23900]; Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., U.N. Do. S/24719 (1992) [hereinafter Doc. S/247191.
129. BLUE HELMETS, supra note 125, at 119-20 (noting that fighting continued while temporary
headquarters for U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon was being established in March 1978); see also 4
ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 306 (1981) (noting
outbreak of fighting after deployment of U.N forces in Cyprus in March 1964).
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to the conflict were willing and able to implement their signed agreements
would suffice. 130
The Japanese government interprets the cease-fire requirement somewhat
more rigidly than does the United Nations. The text of the Peacekeeping Law
supports this more rigid interpretation. Article 3(3)(a) explicitly excludes
restoration of cease-fire conditions from the tasks that may be entrusted to
SDF personnel and limits the SDF to monitoring whether the parties are
observing their cease-fire agreement.' The government is authorized to add
other tasks to the Peacekeeping Law by Cabinet ordinance, but given its
assurances during the legislative debates, it is unlikely that the Cabinet will
add a duty to restore cease-fires.
In the Diet debates of May 1992, Tanba Minoru stated that although the
United Nations was attempting to deploy peacekeepers to regions like the
former Yugoslavia, where cease-fires were not respected, Japan would not
participate in operations beyond the scope of the traditional peacekeeping
functions presupposed by the draft Peacekeeping Law.'32 Legally, this
position was the logical result of a series of government interpretations of the
constitution and of the Peacekeeping Law. This position, however, may not
be sound policy. Peacekeepers are generally sent to areas where it is
impossible to predict whether a cease-fire will be maintained. Should sporadic
cease-fire violations occur, as they often do, and SDF and Corps personnel
are not able to participate, Japan will come to be known as a very limited
player in the international community. After all, if there were a complete and
permanent cease-fire with no possible violations, peacekeepers would be
unnecessary.
2. Consent
Under the Peacekeeping Law, Japan may dispatch peacekeeping forces
only upon the consent of both the host state and other parties to the armed
conflict.' They must consent not only to the U.N. operation itself, but also
to Japanese participation in the operation and to the specific IPCA.'34 This
additional requirement deviates from the general consensus among scholars
that receiving states need not consent to the composition of a peacekeeping
force. 135
130. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991), U.N.
SCOR, 46th Sess., 23, U.N. Doc. S/23280 (1991) [hereinafter Doc. S/232801.
131. On the other hand, it could also be argued that the Peacekeeping Law, which authorizes
Japanese peacekeepers to monitor cease-fire violations, presupposes small-scale violations of cease-fires.
Here, the government interpretation is somewhat more restrictive than the text of the law itself.
132. HC, 123d Sess., Special Comm. No. 13(1), at 18 (May 29, 1992).
133. Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, art. 3(t).
134. Id. art. 6(1).
135. See, e.g., Rosalyn Higgins, A General Assessment of United Nations Peace-Keeping, in UNITED
NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING: LEGAL ESSAYS 1, 5 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1978) [hereinafter LEGAL ESSAYS];
Antonietta Di Blase, The Role of the Host State's Consent with Regard to Non-coercive Actions by the
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Since Japan has more stringent consent requirements than the United
Nations, a situation may arise in which Japan refuses to participate in a U.N.
operation because it disagrees with a U.N. assertion that the receiving state
has given the necessary consent. Alternatively, a party to the conflict may
prevent Japan from participating in a U.N. peacekeeping operation by
declaring that it does not consent to Japan's participation.
Prime Minister Miyazawa acknowledged that the Japanese government
may interpret consent more stringently than the United Nations. t36 For
instance, Iraq's consent to the deployment of the U.N. Iraq-Kuwait
Observation Mission (UNIKOM) may have been inadequate to satisfy the
mandates of the Peacekeeping Law. 137 Even if Iraq's notification of
acceptance to the Secretary-General 13  could be considered consent, Japan
would not be able to continue participating in the operation if Iraq were to
withdraw that consent. 139
The government does not universally apply this strict interpretation of
consent. In the case of a preventive deployment of U.N. peacekeepers, Japan
will relax stringent consent requirements. In this respect the law is very
progressive and future-oriented; it explicitly recognizes Japan's intention to
participate in such operations."4
Article 3(1) of the Peacekeeping Law states that if there has been no
armed conflict, consent for a prophylactic operation will be required from
United Nations, in LEGAL ESSAYS, supra, at 55, 60-61. Even though the selection of national contingents
for a particular U.N. operation is to be made by the United Nations, the host state is consulted and its
views reflected in the selection. See KoZAI, supra note 11, at 368-69.
Consent from the receiving state is unquestionably a fundamental prerequisite for the deployment
of U.N. peacekeeping troops. See, e.g., Henry Wiseman, Peacekeeping in the International Political
Context: HistoricalAnalysis and Future Directions, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND PEACEKEEPINO 32, 38
(Indar Jit Rikhye & Kjell Skjelsbaek eds., 1991). The legal consequences of consent and the role consent
should play in peacekeeping operations, see Di Blase, supra note 135, at 55, however, have yet to be
clarified by U.N. practice or academic writings, see Higgins, supra note 135, at 5. Compare with KOZAI,
supra note 11, at 200 (viewing consent as the most fundamental and overriding principle of peacekeeping
operations) and HIROSE YOSl-O, KOKUREN NO HEIWA IIl KATSUDO [UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS] 130-39 (1992) (emphasizing United Nations' function of maintaining public order and
therefore accepting limits on necessity of state's consent).
136. HR, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 3, at 30 (Nov. 18, 1991); see also HR, 121st Sess.,
Special Comm. No. 4, at 8 (Sept. 26, 1991) (statement of Tanba Minoru).
137. UNIKOM was established by Security Council Resolution 687 as a condition of the cease-fire
imposed upon Iraq by the coalition forces. The Security Council was acting under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter when it established UNIKOM. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg. 5, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/687 (1991). Later, the Security Council made clear that only it could terminate UNIKOM.
S.C. Res. 689, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2983d mtg. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/689 (1991).
138. See Letter from the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Ahmed Hussein, Addressed to Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., at 7, U.N. Doc. S/22456 (1991) (stating Iraq "has no choice but
to accept this resolution").
139. HR, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 6, at 11 (Nov. 21, 1991) (statement of Tanba Minoru);
see also HR, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 3, at 30 (Nov. 18, 1991) (statement of Tanba Minoru).
140. The Secretary-General, in his Agenda for Peace, declared that "the time had come to plan...
for preventive deployment." Preventive deployment was at the time still an innovation. Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 28, U.N. Doc. S/24111 (1992) Ihereinafter
Boutros-Ghalij. In 1992, preventive U.N. deployment occurred for the first time in U.N. peacekeeping




only the host country. Since there is theoretically no conflict in cases of
preventive deployment, the requirements of a cease-fire and impartiality
toward conflicting parties are also not necessary. However, the fiction of "no
conflict" is transparent: consider, for example, the situation in and around the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where peace is tenuous at best and
where political instability has left the area a powder keg waiting to blow.
The Japanese government has explained that Article 3(1) was inserted in
order to permit Japan's participation in operations like that of the U.N.
Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL).141 The Japanese Foreign
Minister has stated more explicitly that Japan can participate in preventive
deployments of U.N. peacekeepers. 42 This is a progressive step for the
Japanese government, especially since the conditions for preventive
deployment have not yet been agreed upon in international fora. t4
3. Impartiality
Japan's participation in U.N. operations may likewise be limited by
Article 3's requirement that U.N. peacekeeping operations be carried out
impartially. Although all U.N. peacekeeping operations meet this requirement
in theory, whether they do so in practice is debatable. 1" Since the condition
of "impartiality" may be subjective, the question of who determines whether
an operation is impartial becomes important. For example, after the election
in Angola, the rebel movement UNITA openly questioned the impartiality of
the second U.N. Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) and condemned
it. 45 In response, the Security Council passed a resolution declaring
UNITA's condemnation of UNAVEM II baseless.'"
The question of impartiality arose during the Diet debates, when one
Diet member alleged that UNIKOM was biased, since a majority of its
observers came from states forming the coalition forces during the Gulf
141. HR, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 5, at 5 (Nov. 20, 1991) (statement of Nomura Kazunari).
UNOGIL was established in 1958 after Lebanon complained that rebellious forces were being supported
by the United Arab Republic (UAR). The Security Council established UNOGIL, with the support of both
Lebanon and the UAR, and stationed it to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration across the Lebanese
border. BLUE HELMETS, supra note 125, at 175.
142. HR, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 5, at 7-8 (Nov. 20, 1991) (statement of Foreign Minister
Watanabe Michio).
143. The U.N. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations discussed this issue in April and May
of 1992 without agreeing on timing and other criteria for deployment. See Kozai, Conflict Management,
supra note 16, at 12-13. In the case of Macedonia, a request from the government of the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia and notice to the authorities of neighboring states were mentioned as factors to be
considered for determining the appropriateness of deployment. S.C. Res. 795, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3147th mtg. 1 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/795 (1992); see also Boutros-Ghali, supra note 140, 11 29-32.
144. Wiseman, supra note 135, at 42.
145. Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission
(UNA VEM II), U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 11 7-8, U.N. Doc. S/24556 (1992).
146. S.C. Res. 785, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3130th mtg. 1 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/785 (1992).
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War. 147 Two other members of the Diet argued that in order for a U.N.
operation to be impartial it must be under the strict command and control of
the United Nations.' 4' The government did not respond to this concern about
UNIKOM's partiality, nor did it specifically recognize a link between U.N.
command and impartiality. The government's silence on this issue makes it
difficult to predict how Japan will react if the impartiality of a peacekeeping
operation is ever in dispute. Japan may align with one side or the other, or it
may make its own independent determination as to the impartiality of the
operation. Such a unilateral determination by Japan could undermine the entire
U.N. operation by weakening the credibility and legitimacy of the United
Nations.
4. Self-defense
Where the prerequisites of Article 3 have been met, Japan still may be
unable to carry out peacekeeping efforts effectively. The Japanese
government's sensitivity to the issue of use of arms and its expectation that the
possibility of the use of arms would raise controversy in the Diet (as it did),
led the government to restrict the use of arms by Japanese peacekeepers to
such a degree that Japanese participation is rendered at best ineffective, and
at worst, damaging to U.N. operations.
Article 24 of the Peacekeeping Law provides that Corps personnel and
SDF members participating in IPCA as units may use arms within the limits
considered reasonably necessary to protect the life or person of themselves or
other SDF or Corps personnel.' 49 The use of arms may not cause harm to
persons except in cases of legitimate defense and necessity as defined in
Articles 36 and 37 of the Penal Code of Japan.' These limitations are
considerably stricter than the U.N. policy on self-defense, which allows U.N.
personnel to use force to protect their own lives and persons, other U.N.
personnel, and U.N. posts, vehicles, and other U.N. facilities, and to
147. HC, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 4, at 9 (Dec. 6, 1991) (statement of Yatabe Osamu,
member of Japan Socialist Party (JSP)).
148. HR, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 3, at 17 (Nov. 18, 1991) (statement of Okada Yoshiharu,
member of JSP); see also HC, 122d Seas., Special Comm. No. 6, at 13 (Dec. 19, 1991) (statement of
Kubota Manae, member of JSP).
149. Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, art. 24(l), (3). Corps personnel may use only small arms;
no such limit applies to SDF members. SDF members working as part of units, however, may be protected
only by other SDF members working as such.
150. The text of Articles 36 and 37 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Article 36: Unavoidable acts done in order to defend the rights of oneself or another person
against imminent and unjust violation are not punishable....
Article 37: Unavoidable acts done in order to avert a present danger to the life, person, liberty
or property of oneaelf or another person are not punishable where the injury occasioned by such acts
does not exceed in degree the injury averted. According to the circumstances, however, the penalty
may be reduced or remitted for acts exceeding such limits. ...
KEH6 [PENAL CODE], Law No. 45 (Apr. 24, 1907), arts. 36, 37.
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counteract attempts to prevent them from performing their U.N. duties.'
According to government statements, under Article 24, the judgment of when
and to what extent arms are to be used rests with the individual rather than
with the individual's superior officers; that is, an individual cannot be ordered
to use force. 1 2 Because the use of arms is thus restricted to self-defense, the
government does not consider such use to be an unconstitutional use of
force.153 Furthermore, since weapons may be used only- to protect Japanese
Corps personnel or SDF members, 54  the government avoids the
characterization of the use of weapons as collective self-defense, which is
unconstitutional under the government's interpretation.
Thus, under the Peacekeeping Law, Corps personnel and SDF members
may be prohibited from assisting U.N. peacekeepers from other states, even
when they are in physical danger. Furthermore, Japanese peacekeepers may
not use force where the objective is to safeguard property or ensure the
success of the peacekeeping mission. Under these circumstances, the
effectiveness and propriety of deploying Japanese peacekeepers becomes
questionable.
Several government officials, perhaps recognizing the conflict between the
Peacekeeping Law and U.N. practice, have suggested that Japan could use
force for purposes other than self-defense, but their statements only add
confusion to an already perplexing problem. 5' For example, former Prime
Minister Kaifu has stated that the use of arms to protect other states'
personnel against an armed attack may constitute a humanitarian measure in
situations of "legitimate defense" or "necessity."56 This contention is
supported by Article 24's reference to Articles 36 and 37 of the Japanese
151. HANDBOOK, supra note 82, at 57-58; Aide-Mginoire Dated 10 April 1964 Concerning Some
Questions Relating to the Function and Operation of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces in Cyprus,
in 4 HIGGINs, supra note 129, at 150-52; Further Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 10, U.N. Doc. S/25123
(1993); Doc. S/24540, supra note 109, 9.
152. HR, 121st Sess., Special Comm. No. 3, at 19 (Sept. 25, 1991) (statement of Ikeda Yukihiko,
Director-General of Defense Agency); see also HR, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 3, at 25 (Nov. 18,
1991) (statement of Hatayama Shigeru, Director of Defense Bureau of Defense Agency) (arguing that the
phrase "The members of the SDF ... may use arms" in Article 24 explicitly supports this interpretation).
153. The government position paper distinguishes between "use of force" and "use of arms" as
follows: "Use of force" in Article 9 of the constitution means belligerent action by Japan using material
and human institutions (butteki-jintekisoshikitai) within an international armed conflict. On the other hand,
"use of arms" as defined in Article 24 of the Peacekeeping Law means use of weapons or other destructive
machinery for their intended purposes. "Use of force" includes "use of arms," but not every "use of
arms" constitutes a "use of force" prohibited by Article 9 of the constitution. For example, the use of arms
for self-defense or defense of other personnel does not violate the constitution. HR, 122d Sess., Special
Comm. No. 3, at 19-20 (Nov. 18, 1991) (statement of lshibashi Daikichi).
154. HR, 121st Sess., Special Comm. No. 3, at 18 (Sept. 25, 1991) (statement of Nomura Kazunari)
(noting that the phrase "Corps personnel" does not include foreign members of U.N. operations).
155. A legal analysis of the scope and limits of self-defense within U.N. peacekeeping operations
remains to be done. See Suy, supra note 125, at 319.
156. HR, 121st Sess., Special Comm. No. 3, at 3 (Sept. 25, 1991).
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Penal Code, which allow acts to protect "oneself or another person."157
Similarly, Kud6 Atsuo, has suggested that the constitution permits the use of
arms against bandits and other private armed elements. He based this
interpretation on Article 9 of the constitution, which prohibits the use of force
within international, as opposed to civil, armed conflicts.' Moreover, Kud6
asserted that the constitution permits the use of arms to thwart forcible
attempts to prevent U.N. peacekeepers from performing their duties, as this
does not necessarily constitute "use of force. ""' The government should
present a consistent view on the use of arms and rectify this confusion,
preferably by codifying its view in the law itself.
The Japanese government has sometimes tried to justify Japanese
deployment by arguing that collective self-defense would not be necessary, as
contingents from different states are deployed in separate, designated areas;
thus, attacks on other states' personnel in Japan's designated area would rarely
occur. 60 This justification, however, does not accurately reflect the practice
of U.N. peacekeeping operations. Designated deployment does occur from
time to time, but contingents are never completely separated. Indeed,
contingents from different states often work together and help one another,
especially when one group is under attack.' 6'
The Peacekeeping Law's use of the domestic law concept of legitimate
individual defense to legitimize the use of arms by U.N. peacekeepers is
fundamentally flawed given the international character of the peacekeepers and
the inherently collective nature of their actions. 16 2 Furthermore, the use of
arms by Japanese peacekeepers under the exclusive and direct command of the
United Nations does not violate the Japanese constitution: Article 9 of the
constitution prohibits war, threats of force, or use of force as a sovereign right
of the nation. The use of arms for self-defense in order to carry out the
mandate of the United Nations is an international action qualitatively different
157. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. Cabinet Councilor Nomura Kazunari, however, has
rejected this interpretation, asserting that Article 35 of the Penal Code, not Articles 36 and 37, provides
the basis for the use of arms by Japanese personnel. Article 35 defines "proper acts" for which no person
may be punished as those done pursuant to a law or ordinance or in the course of legitimate business. In
effect, Nomura merely restated that arms may be used to the extent permitted by the Peacekeeping Law.
HR, 121st Sess., Special Comm. No. 3, at 18 (Sept. 25, 1991).
158. HC, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 4, at 8 (Dec. 6, 1991).
159. HC, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 3, at 10 (Dec. 5, 1991). Precise limits on the use of force
within U.N. operations were not made clear in ensuing debates. The potential for broad interpretation of
statements such as Kud6's could prove very important.
160. HR, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 8, at23 (Nov. 27, 1991) (statementofNomura Kazunari).
161. For example, during the operation of the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a
contingent from Ireland was surrounded by the local Christian militia. Troops from the Netherlands and
Ghana came to help them, but were fired upon. The UNIFIL commander then permitted countermeasures
and asked for support from Fijian and Senegalese troops. FUKUDA KIKU, KOKUREN TO PKO [THE UNITED
NATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS] 143-44 (1992).
162. Tanaka Tadashi, Kokuren no Heiwa lii Katsudo to Nippon no Sanka, Kyoryoku [United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations and Japan's Participation and Cooperation], 443 H6GAKU SEMINAR [Law
Seminar] 36, 39 (1991).
Japanese Peacekeeping Legislation
from the notion of a "sovereign right."163
5. Suspension and Termination
Articles 6(13)(1) and 8(l)(6) of the Peacekeeping Law require that IPCA
be suspended or terminated when any one of the three conditions specified in
Article 3 of the Law - cease-fire, consent of the parties, and impartiality of
the peacekeeping force - is no longer fulfilled. Under U.N. practice, upon
giving reasonable notice, contributing states may withdraw their troops for any
reason, including domestic requirements. The problem is that by requiring
Japan to make a unilateral determination regarding these three conditions,
which are also the international conditions for U.N. operations, the
Peacekeeping Law may undermine the entire operation.
During the Diet debates, the government argued that, if and when U.N.
peacekeeping forces engage in the use of force, there is a danger that the
Japanese contingent may also do so. Even if it does not actually use force, the
Japanese contingent, through participation in the operation, may be
constructively considered an integral part of the action involving force. The
suspension and termination requirement thus ensures that Japanese Corps and
SDF personnel will never be part of operations using force, and that Japanese
participation in U.N. operations will comply with Article 9 of the
constitution.'64 This particular interpretation, which may be called the
"participatory integration theory," has significant legal consequence for
Japanese participation in the new types of U.N. operations discussed in Part
IV.
The ability to suspend or terminate Japanese participation in U.N.
operations is so important to the government that, under the Peacekeeping
Law, a decision on the matter is not subject to the command of the Secretary-
General. Under Article 8(2), the Prime Minister decides matters concerning
suspension of IPCA, and his decisions need not conform with commands of
the Secretary-General.165 This proviso may present a significant practical
problem of command conflicts since the United Nations in the past has
ordered troops to remain in areas where major cease-fire violations have
occurred. 166
163. Onuma Yasuaki, Heiwa Kenpo to Shudan Anzen Hosho (2) [The Peace Constitution and
Collective Security (2)], 92 KOKUSAIH6 GAIK6 ZASSHI [J. INT'L L. & DIPLOMACY] 184, 202-03, 221
(1993).
164. HR, 121st Sess., Special Comm. No. 3, at 3 (Sept. 25, 1991) (statement of Kud6 Atsuo); see
also HR, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 8, at 25 (Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Kud6 Atsuo).
165. Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, art. 8(2); see also HR, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 8,
at 23 (Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Nomura Kazunari) (stating that Prime Minister's determination
regarding suspension trumps commands of Secretary-General or of field commander); HR, 121st Sess.,
Special Comm. No. 3, at 3-4 (Sept. 25, 1991) (statement of Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu) (stating that
final decision on withdrawal and termination of Japanese troops rests with Prime Minister).
166. For example, when UNIFIL was informed that Israel would invade Lebanon, its commander,
General Callaghan, issued instructions to all units, in case of attack by one of the parties, to block
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By incorporating these five principles within the Peacekeeping Law, the
government sought to structure Japanese contributions to U.N. peacekeeping
operations within constitutional strictures. These principles, however, may
conflict with the concept and practice of U.N. peacekeeping operations and
may even call into question the effectiveness and propriety of Japanese
participation in such operations. Japan should simply accept the command of
the United Nations. The scope of the use of arms should conform to general
U.N. practice. Likewise, the United Nations, not Japan or any other
contributing state, should determine whether a cese-fire, consent, and
impartiality exist with regard to a U.N. operation.
In drafting the Peacekeeping Law, the Japanese government relied heavily
on discussions with U.N. Under-Secretary Goulding, who was responsible for
U.N. peacekeeping operations at the time. The government claims that during
those talks Goulding indicated his "understanding" that Japan would only be
able to participate in operations that conformed with the five principles . 67
This understanding, however, does not constitute formal U.N. recognition of
Japan's position.
In 1995, the Japanese government will have an opportunity to address
conflicts between the Peacekeeping Law and U.N. practice. The Peacekeeping
Law specifically requires the government to review the law's operation three
years after its entry into force.'68 This provision does not necessarily require
that the law be amended, but it will provide an opportunity for reconsideration
of the various provisions of the Peacekeeping Law in light of U.N. practice.
The government should use this opportunity to respond to recent developments
in U.N. operations, which are discussed below.
advancing forces, take defensive measures, and stay in position unless their safety was "seriously
imperilled." BLUE HELMETS, supra note 125, at 142. Similarly, when fighting intensified in Angola in
October 1992, the Secretary-General ordered that UNAVEM 1I presence be kept intact throughout the
country. Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission
(UNAVEM 1I), U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 36, U.N. Doc. S/24858 (1992).
167. See HC, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 4, at 15 (Dec. 6, 1991) (statement ofTanba Minoru).
The government has never clearly stated whether Goulding actually consented to the Japanese position on
command of U.N. operations and suspension of Japanese participation in them. See HC, 123d Sess.,
Special Comm. No. 9, at 16-20 (May 18, 1992). In its discussion with Goulding, the government
submitted an English translation of the five principles and explained each of them. The government also
explained that Japan might consider temporarily transferring its troops if the conditions outlined in the five
principles were broken, or withdrawing them if the conditions could not be quickly restored. Goulding
acknowledged Japan's authority to withdraw troops for those reasons. Id. at 16 (statement of Tanba
Minoru). The government then explained that Japan did not intend to deviate from the established practice
of U.N. peacekeeping operations, and that its troops would come under the command of the United
Nations. Goulding responded favorably. The government also said that Japanese participation in U.N.
operations would be possible if the use of arms were limited to the purpose of protecting the life of
Japanese members. Goulding replied that U.N. practice allowed peacekeepers to use arms when necessary
for the execution of peacekeeping activities, but that the Japanese position regarding use of arms would
not pose a problem for the United Nations. Id. at 18 (statement of Tanba Minoru).
168. Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, supplementary provisions, art. 3.
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IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN U.N. PEACEKEEPING/ENFORCEMENT
OPERATIONS: CAN JAPAN PARTICIPATE?
A. Difficulty of Obtaining Consent of the Parties and Use of Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter
The United Nations has recently faced difficulty securing parties' consent
for the deployment and operation of peacekeeping forces, most notably in
Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. The circumstances surrounding such
reluctance differed in each case, and the United Nations responded with
diverse measures grounded in different legal justifications. Thus, in order to
analyze the possible scope of Japanese participation in these new U.N.
operations, we must distinguish among them.
1. Lack of Consent from Small Parties
Both the Peacekeeping Law and U.N. practice require the consent of the
host state as a prerequisite for the deployment of U.N. peacekeeping
operations. 169 Because Japan's determination of consent may conflict with
that of the United Nations, Japan may be forced to undermine a peacekeeping
operation by unilaterally withdrawing its troops. When deciding whether there
is sufficient consent to participate, Japan should consider the determinations
of the Secretary-General and Security Council as authoritative. Japan need not
renounce its sovereign right to decide whether to participate in an operation,
but its legal determination should be consistent with that of the United Nations
so that a recalcitrant party would not be able to take advantage of differences
in interpretation.
In practice, the United Nations has distinguished between the degree of
consent necessary for a legal operation and that necessary for an effective one.
The consent and cooperation of all the parties involved may not be a legal
prerequisite for U.N. deployment, but universal consent and cooperation has
been recognized as a key factor in the effectiveness of operations.
Three basic rules of consent have emerged from recent peacekeeping
169. When peacekeeping operations are implemented under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, consent
is not necessary. In general, however, operations are not undertaken pursuant to the Security Council's
Chapter VII powers. Dan Ciobanu, The Power of the Security Council to Organize Peace-Keeping
Operations, in LEGAL ESSAYS, supra note 135, at 15, 27; see also BLUE HELMETs, supra note 125, at
5; KozAi, supra note 11, at 187-91.
Neither U.N. practice nor academic writings have settled the question of whether the consent of
parties other than the host state is legally necessary. Suy states that past experience shows the need for
"consensus" among all the parties involved. Suy, supra note 125, at 318. Professor Kozai also argues that
peacekeeping operations should be based on at least the implied consent or cooperation of the parties
directly involved in a conflict, because such parties have effective control over certain territory and
therefore the power to frustrate U.N. operations. KOZA, supra note 11, at 183; see also Wiseman, supra
note 135, at 41.
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operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. First, all major parties to
a conflict must agree to a cease-fire and consent to the deployment of U.N.
forces.170 Second, small factions involved in the fighting need not consent,
presumably because these factions often have no political authority.17 1 For
example, UNPROFOR was established and deployed in Croatia even though
a Serbian leader in Croatia objected to its deployment.'7  Third, in the
absence of a general cease-fire or lack of consent by all factions, the United
Nations may deploy peacekeepers to specific areas where consents and cease-
fire agreements have been secured. Thus, the first U.N. Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM I) was deployed in Mogadishu where the two controlling factions
agreed to a cease-fire and the deployment of UNOSOM. 7
170. The recent peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Angola, and Mozambique support this rule.
In these cases, recognizable political bodies controlled the armed forces, so that the United Nations could
easily negotiate a cease-fire and obtain consent. Securing consent in more chaotic political situations is
problematic. For the Cambodian peace agreement signed by all four conflicting parties prior to the
deployment of UNTAC, see The FinalAct of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, U.N SCOR, 46th Sess.,
Annex, 11, U.N. Doc. S/23177 (1991). For the Angolan agreement between the government forces and
UNITA, see The Peace AccordforAngola, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/22609 (1991).
For the Mozambiquan General Peace Agreement signed between the government and the Resistencia
Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO) before ONUMOZ was deployed, see The General Peace Agreement
for Mozambique, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/24635 (1992).
171. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, UNPROFOR was deployed even while activities of those with no
recognizable political authority posed a serious threat to the security of U.N. personnel. Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 752, U.N. SCOR., 47th Sess., 1 16, U.N.
Doc. S/24000 (1992). In Somalia, a U.N. technical team was deployed in Mogadishu despite the
opposition of numerous armed bandits and other elements not controlled by established political factions.
The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 1 73, U.N. Doc.
S/23693 (1992) [hereinafter Doc. S/23693]. The Secretary-General, however, recognized that Somalia
presented a special challenge to the Security Council. Id. 11 76-78.
172. Doc. S/23280, supra note 130, 1 13. When the Geneva Agreement among the main political
leaders of Yugoslavia was signed on November 23, 1991, Letter Dated 24 November 1991 from the
Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Annex,
U.N. Doc. S/23239 (1991), and its implementation was secured in January 1992, the Security Council
confirmed that the main obstacle to U.N. deployment had been removed, but expressed concern that the
plan had not been fully and unconditionally accepted by all factions in Yugoslavia, Further Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 11 11-14, 16,
U.N. Doc. S/23363 (1992); see also S.C. Res. 740, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3049th mtg., U.N. Doc.
SIRES/740 (1992). The Secretary-General also stated that "the danger that a United Nations peace-keeping
operation will fail because of lack of cooperation from the parties is less grievous than the danger that
delay in its dispatch will lead to a breakdown of the cease-fire and to a new conflagration in Yugoslavia."
Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Sess., 1 28, U.N. Doc. S/23592 (1992). UNPROFOR was established by S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., 3055 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (1992) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 743], and its full deployment
was authorized by S.C. Res. 749, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3066th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/749 (1992).
173. In Somalia, many armed factions controlled different areas. For example, 14 factions
participated in the conference on national reconciliation held in January 1993. See U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
Annex 1, U.N. Doc. S/25168 (1993). The United Nations initially limited its activities to Mogadishu,
where the two controlling factions had agreed to a cease-fire and the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers.
See Doc. S/23693, supra note 171, Annexes 1, 3. After securing the consent of both factions in
Mogadishu, Doc. S/23829, supra note 109, Annex l(a)-l(b), the Security Council established UNOSOM
and deployed 50 military observers, S.C. Res. 751, supra note 109. Later, the two factions agreed to the
deployment of a 500-member security force in Mogadishu as part of UNOSOM. Letter Dated August 12,
1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/24451 (1992).
The United Nations simultaneously negotiated new agreements with factions controlling other areas.
See Doc. S/23829, supra note 109, 1 15-19. (detailing such efforts); The Situation in Somalia: Report
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The Japanese Peacekeeping Law does not distinguish between legal
prerequisites and conditions for effectiveness. As the government explained
during Diet debates, the law requires consent not only from the major parties
to a conflict, but also from all other conflicting parties.74 This requirement
is more stringent than that which has evolved- through U.N. practice and may
inhibit Japanese participation in U.N. operations.
2. Lack of Consent from Major Parties
In order to legally deploy and continue peacekeeping operations, the
United Nations must first obtain the consent of the major parties to a conflict.
In the former Yugoslavia, however, the major parties were unwilling to
cooperate fully with UNPROFOR. In such a situation the United Nations' first
response is to make every effort to obtain the parties' consent. 175 This effort
proved unsuccessful in the former Yugoslavia, and the Security Council
eventually invoked Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. This measure marked
a significant development in U.N. peacekeeping operations: it was the first
time the United Nations maintained a peacekeeping operation without the
consent of major parties to the conflict. 
76
It is important to distinguish between two situations in the peacekeeping
context where the Security Council resorts to Chapter VII. In the first, the
Security Council invokes Chapter VII to extend temporarily the legal basis of
a peacekeeping operation when, for technical reasons, the consent of the
parties cannot be obtained. In the other situation, the Security Council invokes
Chapter VII to impose its terms irrespective of acceptance by the parties
involved. The former can still be characterized as a peacekeeping operation;
the latter is a coercive operation with many disadvantages and difficulties.
The Security Council invoked Chapter VII in the first situation when,
with Resolution 807, it decided to extend the peacekeeping mandate of
UNPROFOR in Croatia without the consent of the Croatian government or the
Serbian authority based in Krajina. As the mandate of UNPROFOR was
nearing its end in early 1993,177 the major parties withdrew their support for
the original peace plan on which the presence of UNPROFOR in Croatia was
of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 25-26, U.N. Doc. S/24480 (1992) [hereinafter Doc.
S/244801 (regarding efforts to obtain such agreements in Bossasso, Berbera, and Kismasu).
174. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
175. For example, when deployment of UNPROFOR forces in "pink zones" encountered resistance
from the Croatian government, the Secretary-General made every effort to obtain its consent. The Security
Council authorized the expansion of the UNPROFOR's mandate only after the consent of the Croatian
government had been obtained. Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 752, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 18, U.N. Doc. S/24188 (1992); S.C. Res. 762, U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., 3088th mtg. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/762 (1992).
176. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
177. UNPROFOR was originally given a 12-month mandate starting with the adoption of Security
Council Resolution 743, supra note 172, 3 (1992).
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founded.178 The Croatian government argued that the overall political
situation upon which the United Nations relied to justify its presence had
changed drastically since Croatia became a sovereign state. 79 The Serbian
authority contended that since the present peacekeeping plan was signed by the
President of Serbia and the leader of the National Defense of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (JNA), who no longer had any locus standi
in the area, the mandate had to be negotiated anew with the Republic of Serb
Krajina.o18
Faced with this difficult situation, the Secretary-General recommended
that the United Nations extend UNPROFOR's mandate for one month in
hopes that political negotiations could yield a new agreement.' Responding
to this recommendation, the Security Council adopted Resolution 80782 and,
acting under Chapter VII, demanded that the parties comply fully with the
U.N. peacekeeping plan in Croatia. The Security Council also urged the
parties to cooperate with U.N. political settlement efforts in order to ensure
full implementation of the peacekeeping mandate in Croatia.' Thus, until
a new agreement was reached, the original peacekeeping plan was imposed
and implemented without consent of the major parties to the conflict. The
principal reason for resorting to Chapter VII was to temporarily circumvent
the consent requirement. This did not, however, change the substantive nature
of the operation. The parties to the conflict did not reject the United Nations'
presence outright, but rather raised technical objections like "locus standi"
and "inappropriate mandate" to argue that the United Nations should leave.
Further, the United Nations genuinely expected to negotiate a new
mandate. 184
The second, more coercive use of Chapter VII occurred in Croatia after
the Security Council adopted Resolution 815.185 The Serbian authority in
Croatia was increasingly defying the United Nations. The Serbian assembly
refused to accept the peacekeeping plan agreed upon by the Croatian
government and the Serbian authority'86 and thus effectively prevented the
178. As early as September 1992, the Serbian authority in Croatia insisted that the Vance
peacekeeping plan would have to be amended. Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 743 and 762, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 1 9, U.N. Doc. S/24600 (1992).
179. Doc. S/25264, supra note 83, 11 24-25.
180. Id. 125.
181. Id. 11 38-39.
182. S.C. Res. 807, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3174th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRESI807 (1993)
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 807].
183. Id. 11 1, 6.
184. When the Secretary-General and Security Council needed more time for political negotiations,
they extended their mandate until June 30, 1993. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 807, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 1 4, U.N. Doc. S/25470 (1993); see also S.C. Res. 815,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3189th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRESI815 (1993) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 815].
185. S.C. Res. 815, supra note 184.
186. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 802, 807 and 815,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25555 (1993).
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agreement from coming into force."8 7 The Serbian authority also asserted
that recent developments had destroyed the Serbian population's confidence
in the impartiality of UNPROFOR and that they now viewed it as a hostile
presence.'88 The Serbs opposed UNPROFOR largely because the Security
Council had recognized "the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia"
in Resolution 815,189 even though the Serbian authority claimed a separate
statehood in Croatia."90 On the opposite front, the Croatian government
stated that it would reject the UNPROFOR's mandate if UNPROFOR could
not effectively discharge the tasks entrusted to it.'9'
The reliance on Chapter VII in Croatia under these circumstances cannot
be characterized as a temporary and technical extension of the peacekeeping
operation. The operation had changed into a coercive one, carried out without
consent of the conflicting parties. Consent nevertheless remains an important
element for the effectiveness of coercive peacekeeping operations. In May
1993, the Secretary-General suggested that UNPROFOR withdraw unless the
two parties made genuine progress in political negotiations and agreed to a
peacekeeping plan.
t92
The invocation of Chapter VII to create certain "safe areas" in Bosnia-
Herzegovina similarly marked a departure from traditional peacekeeping
operations. The use of Chapter VII in Resolutions 819 (which designated
Srebrenica as a safe area) and 824 (which designated Sarajevo and four other
areas as safe areas) was neither a technical nor temporary measure to buy
time for more political negotiations. The Security Council intended to impose
terms specifically on the Bosnian Serbs."' Even though the adoption of
Chapter VII resolutions creating sife areas may lead to an agreed-upon
operational plan for UNPROFOR, 9' the basic character of the operation
187. The agreement provided that it would enter into force when both parties had assured that they
would not station police in any area from which Croatian government troops would withdraw. The
Croatians complied, but the Serb assembly refused to give the required assurance. Report of the Secretary-
General on the Activities of the Co-Chairnen of the Steering Conmnittee of the International Conference
of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25708 (1993); Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 815, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 8, U.N. Doc. S/25777
(1993) [hereinafter Doc. S/25777].
188. Doc. S/25777, supra note 187, 4 15-16.
189. S.C. Res. 815, supra note 184, pmbl. 2.
190. The Secretary-General acknowledged that "the aspiration of the local Serbs to sovereignty has
to a large extent determined their attitude towards the presence of UNPROFOR and the provisions of the
Peace-keeping plan." U.N. Doc. S/25777, supra note 187, 6.
191. Id. 19.
192. Id. 21.
193. S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3199th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/819 (1993)
(demanding cessation of shelling and armed attacks against Srebrenica by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units
and condemning their "ethnic cleansing"); S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3208th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/824 (1993) (mentioning continued hostile actions by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against
several towns).
194. An operational plan was actually adopted for Srebrenica. See U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex
2, U.N. Doc. S/25700 (1993). However, its implementation encountered reluctance from the Serbian side.
Report of the Security Council Mission Established Pursuant to Resolution 819 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., 27, U.N. Doc. S/25700 (1993).
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remained a coercive measure taken without the consent of the parties.
Can Japan participate in the two types of Chapter VII operations? Under
the Peacekeeping Law and ordinary U.N. peacekeeping practices, consent
must be obtained from the major parties to the conflict. In situations where the
Security Council resorts to Chapter VII without changing the nature of the
operation, as in Resolution 807, Japan, under the present Peacekeeping Law,
may need to suspend its IPCA because of the absence - however
temporary - of consent of the parties. It is in such cases, however, that U.N.
presence is most needed, and by suspending Japanese participation, the
government may irreparably damage the entire U.N. peacekeeping operation.
Thus, in these situations, the Prime Minister (who, as Chief of Headquarters,
has the authority to terminate or suspend IPCA) should construe the
Peacekeeping Law as allowing continued Japanese participation. Article 6 of
the Peacekeeping Law provides that revisions of the Implementation Plan,
including those "pertaining to the termination of dispatch . . . shall be
effected" 95 when consent is "deemed to have ceased to exist."196 Article
8, however, provides that Operating Procedures are to be revised to conform
with commands of the Secretary-General "unless otherwise deemed necessary"
by the Prime Minister in matters concerning the suspension of IPCA.'97 It
could be argued that this language gives the Prime Minister discretion in
deciding whether to suspend the IPCA after considering all relevant
factors.'98 Therefore, if an absence of consent is not likely to persist, the
Prime Minister should not suspend IPCA during a Resolution 807-type action.
Although the text of the Peacekeeping Law supports this interpretation,
the political environment does not. Passage of the Peacekeeping Law was
based on the premise that if consent ceased to exist, Japan would at least
suspend the operation until a new agreement could be worked out. Departing
from this position would discredit the government; the public would view
failure to suspend IPCA during absence of consent as backpedaling. Here,
too, international demands on Japan and domestic political constraints are in
conflict.
Where a major party revokes consent outright, as in Croatia after the
adoption of Resolution 815, withdrawal of the U.N. operation and termination
of the Japanese IPCA would occur simultaneously unless the United Nations
decided to invoke Chapter VII. If the United Nations thus continued its
operation, the operation would change to a coercive enterprise, and, under the
195. Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, art. 6(13) (emphasis added).
196. Id. art. 6(13)(1).
197. Id. art. 8(2).
198. The government's statements seem to support this interpretation. It has described termination
of IPCA as the final step in a series of steps in which the government first determines that a cease-fire,
impartiality, or consent has ceased to exist; suspends the operation; and, if the adverse condition continues,
terminates participation. For example, Kud6 Atsuo explained that if a cease-fire is violated and not
restored in a short period, then the dispatch of Japanese troops will be terminated. HR, 121st Sess.,
Special Comm. No. 3, at 3 (Sept. 25, 1991).
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present Peacekeeping Law, Japan would no longer be able to participate.
Considering the disadvantages and difficulties surrounding these coercive
operations, Japanese abstention from them seems legitimate. When a
peacekeeping operation turns to a coercive one, the conflicting parties often
become hostile to the United Nations and the hostility may ultimately
culminate in actual attack on U.N. peacekeepers .199
Japan should make every effort to dissuade the United Nations from
shifting into Chapter VII gear and carrying out coercive operations. Because
it is not considered a military power, Japan is viewed by states hosting U.N.
missions as truly impartial. This reputation for neutrality, along with the
perception that Japanese Corps and SDF personnel are well disciplined and
trained, makes Japanese participation in U.N. operations particularly valued.
The Peacekeeping Law can thus function as a strong source of political
leverage against coercive operations, and may even influence the development
of U.N. peacekeeping practice.
B. "Peace-Enforcement Operations" Under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his Agenda for Peace,
proposed the creation of what he called "peace-enforcement units" to restore
and maintain cease-fires to which parties have agreed but not complied." °
He also suggested that security deployments may be necessary to protect U.N.
personnel where hostile factions have attempted to frustrate a U.N.
operation.2"' This suggestion was put into operation in Somalia. The
deployment of peace-enforcement and security forces represents one of the
most significant developments in U.N. operations in recent years.202
1. Co-existence of Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcement Operations
The situation in Somalia presented a special challenge for the international
199. For example, deliberate attacks by Serbs against UNPROFOR soldiers increased in number
from late March to April of 1993. The attacks have resulted in three dead and five wounded in 13
incidents. U.N. Doc. S/25777, supra note 187, 1 15.
200. Boutros-Ghali, supra note 140, 1 44.
201. Id. 1 68. These security measures would not be taken under Article 43 but rather under other
provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Id. 11 42-44.
202. Because humanitarian relief convoys were frequently frustrated by armed elements in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, adopted Resolution 770, which called upon
states to take all necessary measures to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. S.C. Res. 770,
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/770 (1992). Later, an agreement between the
Secretary-General and the Security Council explained that these operations were based on established
principles and practice of U.N. peacekeeping operations. Doc. S/24540, supra note 109, 11 1, 9; S.C.
Res. 776, supra note 83 (authorizing expansion of UNPROFOR mandate to correspond to report of
Secretary-General). Thus, the Bosnian case is not a "peace-enforcement" operation. Kozai, Conflict
Management, supra note 16, at 9-10.
19941
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
community.2"3 The armed factions, which had initially agreed to a cease-fire
and consented to the deployment of the U.N. Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM I), became increasingly hostile to the United Nations and started
to defy U.N. authority.2' The armed factions confined a 500-man Pakistani
battalion to its base and thereby prevented it from carrying out its mandate.
These actions threatened the relief convoys and relief distribution centers, as
well as the security of U.N. personnel and other relief workers. In response,
the Security Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, 5
invoked Chapter VII and passed Resolution 794, which authorized the
Secretary-General and U.N. member states to use all necessary means to
establish a secure environment for the humanitarian relief operation in
Somalia.2"s The resulting operation, later known as the Unified Task Force
(UNITAF), was created and controlled primarily by the United States0 7 and
was under U.S. central command.2 8 This distinguishes UNITAF from
peacekeeping operations established by the Security Council, which are
commanded and controlled by the U.N. Secretary-General.
Thus, two institutionally separate operations existed simultaneously in
Somalia: UNOSOM I under U.N. command, and UNITAF under U.S.
command. On the field, the two deployments complemented each other.20 9
For example, the UNOSOM I infantry battalion deployed two companies to
Mogadishu airport, where they worked with UNITAF to maintain security in
the area.2 1°
203. Doc. S/23693, supra note 171, 41 73, 76, 78; see also Report of the Secretary-General on the
Situation in Somalia, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 1 21, U.N. Doc. S/24343 (1992); Doc. S/24480, supra
note 173.
204. Some of these incidents, caused mainly by the faction led by General Mohammed Farah Aidid,
are described in the Secretary-General's letter of November 1992. Letter Dated 24 November 1992 from
the Secretary-GeneralAddressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 1 1-4,
U.N. Doc. S/24859 (1992).
205. Letter Dated 29 November 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 11 1-3, U.N. Doc. S/24868 (1992).
206. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992)
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 794].
207. See id. 1 8 (welcoming U.S. offer "concerning the establishment of an operation to create such
a secure environment"), 1 10 (authorizing "Member States cooperating to implement the offer [to use
force]").
208. For a brief account of the UNITAF operation, see Report by the United States Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/24976 (1992); Letter
Dated 19 January 1993from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United
Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc.
S/25126 (1993) (discussing composition of UNITAF); see also Further Report of the Secretary-General
Submitted in Pursuant of Paragraph 18 and 19 of Resolution 794, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 6, U.N.
Doc. S/25354 (1993) [hereinafter Doc. S/253541.
209. Because the United States operated outside of the circle of U.N. influence during the Gulf War,
the Security Council made an effort to integrate the United Nations into UNITAF. See S.C. Res. 794,
supra note 206, 4 10, 12 (Secretary-General and member states authorized to make arrangements for
unified command and control of UNITAF), 1 13 (detailing coordination with United Nations), 18
(requiring United States to submit report on regular basis).
210. The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of
Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Security Council Resolution 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 7, U.N. Doc.
S/24992 (1992) [hereinafter Doc. S/24992].
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Under the present Peacekeeping Law, Japan will not be able to participate
in the kind of force established by Resolution 794. Because UNITAF was
neither established nor carried out by the United Nations, Japanese
participation would have directly conflicted with Article 3(1) of the
Peacekeeping Law, which stipulates that Japan may participate only in
peacekeeping operations under U.N. control.21 Moreover, since UNITAF's
mandate involved the use of force, Japanese participation would have violated
Article 2(2) of the Peacekeeping Law, as well as Japan's constitution.
Could Japan have participated in UNOSOM I, which carried out its
peacekeeping activities together with, and under the protection of,
UNITAF?.2 2 The answer to this question is vitally important to determining
Japan's role in the international community.
While Japan might have been able to participate in UNOSOM I if its
function were not an integral part of UNITAF's mandate, the existence of
close UNITAF-UNOSOM I working methods suggests that a separate function
may not exist within this type of peacekeeping operation. Applying the
government's rule of integration,2"3 the logistical support provided by
Japanese peacekeepers for UNITAF may be characterized as an integral part
of UNITAF's use of force and, therefore, an unconstitutional exercise of
collective self-defense. It would be impractical, if not absurd, for Japan to
insist that the SDF provide logistical support or medical services for
UNOSOM I personnel but not for UNITAF personnel.
Even if these issues were resolved, it could still be argued that hostility
toward U.N. involvement, which necessitated a force like UNITAF, would
have excluded Japan from the beginning. Given the U.N. practice of
deploying peacekeepers even where armed bandits or small factions object to
U.N. involvement, operations like UNITAF may become more prevalent. If
so, the implications could be far-reaching. If forceful operations like UNITAF
become the norm, and the Peacekeeping Law is interpreted to prohibit Japan
from participating in simultaneously existing operations that do not involve the
use of force, then the entire purpose of the law will be undermined. The law
was drafted, after all, to expand Japan's role in U.N. peacekeeping.
2. Peace-enforcement Operations Under U.N. Command
UNITAF carried out its mission until early May 1993 when the operation
was transferred to the newly created U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM
I).214 The Secretary-General referred to UNOSOM II as "the first operation
of its kind to be authorized by the international community."2"5 Unlike
211. See supra part III.B.
212. See Kozai, Conflict Management, supra note 16, at 16.
213. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
214. S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3188th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (1993).
215. Doc. S/25354, supra note 208, 101.
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UNITAF, UNOSOM II remained under the exclusive command and control
of the Secretary-General.2" 6 The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII,
authorized UNOSOM II to use any enforcement measures necessary to
establish a secure environment for humanitarian operations in Somalia," 7
enforce the cease-fire, and neutralize armed elements attacking U.N.
personnel.2"8 To carry out these functions, UNOSOM II included combat
forces.21 9 The Secretary-General could deploy UNOSOM II at his
discretion, even without the consent of local faction leaders. 220 Thus,
Resolution 814, realizing the proposal made by the Secretary-General in his
Agenda for Peace, effectively transformed the U.N. operation from
peacekeeping to peace-enforcement. 22
The Peacekeeping Law bars Japan from participating in the kind of
operation established by Security Council Resolution 814. Article 2(2) of the
Peacekeeping Law prohibits the use of force by Japanese peacekeepers even
under U.N. command. The United Nations' sanctioning of UNOSOM's use
of force where necessary conflicts with this provision. Moreover, because
UNOSOM II is allowed to act without the parties' consent, the operation may
not fulfill the conditions stipulated in Article 3(1) of the law.
The question remains whether Japan can participate in a non-enforcement
or non-military function incidental to a UNISOM II-type operation if the
consent of the parties is secured.222 According to the government's
"participatory integration theory, "2' any SDF involvement will violate the
constitution and Article 2(2) of the Peacekeeping Law because, through its
participation, Japan becomes integrated into the operation and is considered
part of the use of force. However, the text of the Law is not dispositive of
this issue, and an operation such as UNOSOM II may fit into the
Peacekeeping Law's definition of a "peacekeeping operation." Perhaps the
non-combat activities enumerated in Article 3(3) can also be performed by
SDF personnel within an operation like UNOSOM II without that activity
being "tantamount to threat or use of force" prohibited by Article 2(2). If the
government does not intend for Japan to participate at all in an operation such
216. The "Tactical Quick Reaction Force" provided by the United States remained technically
outside the command structure of the United Nations but was designed to provide protection at the request
of the UNOSOM Force Commander. Id. 4 71, 73.
217. Id. 91.
218. Id. 57.
219. Id. 44 71, 75-77.
220. Id. 97.
221. As of April 5, 1993, 30 states had provided troops to UNOSOM II, including Germany (despite
constitutional limitations) and the Republic of Korea (participating in U.N. operations for the first time).
LetterDated 2 April 1993from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25532 (1993).
222. Consent is not impossible in such a situation. For example, if enforcement actions were to be
taken against any party violating the cease-fire agreement, the parties might well consent to such an
operation.
223. See supra note 164 and accompanying text; see also HR, 122d Sess., Special Comm. No. 8,
at 25 (Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Kud6 Atsuo).
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as UNOSOM II, it should clearly state so in the law.
The "integration theory" should not apply to civilian participation. Before
the adoption of the Peacekeeping Law, civilian participation was legally
permissible in any situation. Because the Peacekeeping Law was intended to
broaden Japanese participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations while
maintaining specific restrictions on SDF activities, it would be illogical to
conclude that the Peacekeeping Law narrows the scope of Japanese civilian
participation in those operations.
The Peacekeeping Law does not adequately address the permissible scope
of Japanese participation in "grey-area" operations like those emerging in
response to the exigencies in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. Government
interpretations, expressed during Diet debates, supplement the Peacekeeping
Law's provisions in these deficient areas. According to these interpretations,
Japan may require consent from all parties to the conflict before it will
participate in peacekeeping operations, despite U.N. determinations to the
contrary. Japan may withdraw its troops when consent is lacking, even though
such a situation may be one in which the United Nations' presence is most
urgent. And Japan may be prohibited from participating in purely
"peacekeeping" tasks simply because other components of the entire operation
have the authority to use force if necessary.
How effective Japanese participation in U.N. operations can be will
undoubtedly depend on how Japan settles these issues. Resolving these issues
will not be easy; domestic consensus has not yet been reached on whether
Japan should participate in more dangerous operations.224 The Japanese
government must clarify, preferably in the text of the law itself, the precise
scope of participation under various circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
Japan, fifty years after the Second World War, has expressed a desire to
participate actively in U.N. operations for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security. The Japanese government codified this noble
aspiration into concrete law when it passed the Peacekeeping Law. In doing
so, however, the government was constrained by the forces of history, law,
and domestic and international politics. The result was a clearly opportunistic
piece of legislation, more concerned with domestic political problems than
224. The Japanese reacted hysterically to the deaths of one Japanese peacekeeper and one volunteer
in Cambodia. Philip Senon, Japan Presses U.N. on Cambodia Peril, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1993, at A10.
Many condemned the government for not adequately explaining the "danger" of peacekeeping operations.
Sasaki Atsuyuki, Shisha no Rei ni Kawatte lu [Speaking for the Spirits of the Dead], BUNGEISHUNJU
[CULTURE AND ARTS TIMES], July 1993, at 164; Chuma Kiyofuku, PKO: Dai NiiRonsen e [Peacekeeping
Operations: Toward the Second Debate], SEKAI [THE WORLD], July 1993, at 31.
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with Japan's effective participation in U.N. operations.2z
The Peacekeeping Law conveyed a clear message: Japanese participation
in U.N. operations will be limited. The government decided that Japan will
only' participate in "peacekeeping operations," not "United
Nations-authorized" forces like the coalition deployed during the Gulf War
or UNITAF in Somalia. Nor will Japan participate in new types of peace-
enforcement or coercive measures undertaken without the consent of the major
parties involved in the conflict.
The Japanese policy of participating only in purely peacekeeping
operations can be a positive force in global politics. History shows that
coercive enforcement measures often extend and prolong a conflict, increasing
the number of human casualties. 26 The recourse to forceful measures must
be a last resort and must be based on a discreet decision of the United
Nations. Japan should present its domestic commitment to peace as an
example and use it as political leverage to persuade the United Nations to
exhaust all available measures before resorting to Chapter VII.
227
The Peacekeeping Law is ambiguous in many ways. Where it does speak
clearly, it often deviates from the established practices of U.N. peacekeeping.
Japan must clarify these ambiguities and resolve these differences before it can
effectively discharge its peacekeeping duties. Moreover, Japan must establish
firm policies with respect to several issues raised by recent U.N. operations.
This policy clarification must be achieved before Japan decides to "un-freeze"
SDF units and allow their participation in military-type peacekeeping
activities. Because-this policy clarification is a political decision, it should be
based on popular consensus. The statutorily mandated Diet review of the
Peacekeeping Law, to be conducted in 1995, is an excellent opportunity to
clarify Japan's peacekeeping policy. 228 Once it has clearly defined the scope
of the military operations in which it intends to participate, Japan should strive
to become a permanent member of the Security Council. By doing so, Japan
can effectively voice its concerns over developments in U.N. peacekeeping
practices.
The government should emphasize several areas when clarifying its
peacekeeping policies. First, Japan must demand that the United Nations
control all U.N. peacekeeping operations. U.N. command gives the operations
the legitimacy that the Japanese government can rely upon to justify to the
225. The Peacekeeping Law was drafted to avoid the problems encountered by the draft U.N.
cooperation law in the Diet. Tsutsui Wakamizu, Reisen Shoketsu to Kokuren Kyoryoku: PKO Kyoryoku
Ho no Kokusai HO-Teki Shiten [The End of Cold War and U.N. Cooperation: The Peacekeeping Law and
its International Law Aspects], 1011 JURISUTO [JURIST] 27, 29 (1992).
226. HANDBOOK, supra note 82, at 1; Doe. S/23900, supra note 128, 27, 30.
227. Kenkyakai: PKO Kyoryoku Han no HO-Teki hni [Symposium: The Legal Significance of the
Draft Peacekeeping Law], 991 JURISUTO [JURIST] 60, 78 (1991) (statement of Professor Tsutsui).
228. The government also views 1995, the year in which Peacekeeping Law will be reviewed, as
an opportunity to discuss these issues. GAIMUSH6 [MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS], GAIKO SEISHO:
TENKANKi NO SEKAI TO NIPPON: 1992 [BLUE BOOK ON DIPLOMACY: 19921 58-60 (1992).
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public its dispatch of troops abroad. Moreover, U.N. control assures that
peacekeeping operations will remain impartial and international in character,
which is explicitly required by the Peacekeeping Law. In addition, where the
United Nations is in command, Japanese personnel may use force for self-
defense without violating Article 9 of the constitution. The language of the
Peacekeeping Law should be revised to explicitly require U.N. command and
control of peacekeeping operations.
Second, Japan should rely on U.N. determinations on whether conditions
like a cease-fire and party consent have been satisfied. This is not to say that
Japan should have no power to decide whether or not to participate in a
peacekeeping operation. 29 The Prime Minister should make the decision to
participate, preferably after the Diet considers the question. Reliance on U.N.
determinations on legal issues, however, avoids the unnecessary confusion
created by Japanese unilateral determinations. Strict adherence to the U.N.
determination is presupposed by the purpose of the Peacekeeping Law to
"contribute actively to United Nations-centered efforts for international
peace."" 0 When it questions the United Nations' judgement on legal issues,
Japan disregards this basic premise behind its participation in U.N.
peacekeeping operations.
Third, the government's "official interpretations," which currently define
the precise scope and limits of the Peacekeeping Law, should be integrated
into the text. Both the government's interpretation of the "use of arms" by the
Japanese SDF and its "integration theory" are fundamental in determining the
constitutionality and effectiveness of Japanese participation in U.N.
operations. Yet, because they have not been codified in the law, they are of
dubious legal force.
Fourth, since the recent development of U.N. peacekeeping operations
clearly demonstrates that larger and more comprehensive operations will be
deployed in the future, Japan should diversify and increase its contribution.
The trend combining peacekeeping and peace-making opens wide a door for
Japan to diversify its non-military contribution to U.N. comprehensive
operations. 2 For example, Japan could contribute its valuable expertise in
electoral management and administrative assistance. The United Nations must
actively utilize political settlement mechanisms outside of peacekeeping
operations, and Japan should continue to increase its participation in and
229. No state is internationally obligated to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations.
Furthermore, a state can limit its participation to comply with domestic legal requirements. KOZAI, supra
note 11, at 183.
230. Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, art. 1.
231. A comprehensive operation will not only involve a military component, but also require efforts
directed to restoration of a functioning political, electoral, and police administration, and an emphasis on
observance of human rights. The U.N. Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, UNTAC in
Cambodia, UNAVEM in Angola, and ONUMOZ in Mozambique are all comprehensive operations that
have included, to varying degrees, electoral and police administration and political restructuring.
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support for these non-military components." Toward this end, the
government may need to relax the present cap of 2000 IPCA personnel. 3
While there may be policy reasons for maintaining a maximum number of
SDF personnel, these reasons do not apply equally to civilian and police
personnel since their participation does not raise constitutional problems on
the domestic front and does not raise fear of reemergence of militarism on the
international front. Japan should facilitate greater participation in these
expanded, non-military U.N. operations.
Finally, the Japanese government should encourage interdisciplinary study
of U.N. peacekeeping operations. This will increase Japan's understanding of
the content and evolution of U.N. operations and enable the government to
make sound policy decisions when asked to participate in an operation. To
facilitate this understanding, the government should allow publication of
Operating Procedures and correspondence with the United Nations." The
use of Chapter VII and its influence on peacekeeping, the relation between
enforcement units and peacekeeping forces, the conditions for preventive
deployment, and the scope and limits of self-defense during peacekeeping are
all areas that require more detailed examination.
Japan's participation in and support for U.N. operations should be based
on a long-term strategy for influencing the direction of the United Nations.
Japan should work within the United Nations to influence its practices in
accordance with this strategy. The 1992 Japanese Peacekeeping Law, if
implemented properly, can be an effective tool in this endeavor.
Freed from the confinements of the Cold War, the United Nations is
experiencing a period of immense growth. Its matured form will greatly
depend upon the nourishment that member states provide. Japan must not miss
"the moment for seizing. 35
232. Japan, for example, was an active participant in the political settlement of the Cambodian
conflict. It was one of 18 signatories to the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia and made
efforts to convince the Khmer Rouge to abide by the Act. See Report of the Secretary-General on the
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 783 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Annex 1, U.N. Doc.
S/24800 (1992). It also established a Trust Fund for the Somalia-Unified Command and contributed $100
million. Doc. S/24992, supra note 210, 10. Japan is also participating in the Donors Conference for
Mozambique and contributing financial support. See Letter Dated 30 December 1992 from the Charge
D'Affaires A.L of the Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-
General, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annexes 1,4, U.N. Doc. S/25044 (1993).
233. Peacekeeping Law, supra note 2, art. 18.
234. The Japanese government has insisted on keeping many of its communications confidential. For
example, the Japanese government has made public neither the contents of a verbal communication to the
Secretary-General regarding its participation in UNTAC nor the Secretary-General's response.
235. Thomas M. Franck, United Nations Based Prospects for A New Global Order, 22 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 601, 602 (1990).
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